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Introduction

Diplomacy is inarguably the central act through which international relations of all
states is conducted. American diplomacy has been a longstanding tradition, beginning with
the first American Ambassador to France, Benjamin Franklin, who set the precedent for the
qualities of an ambassador and the roles of peacekeeping, negotiation, understanding, and
representation. However, the role of a United States' diplomat has been forced to change
within an increasingly globalized world with new state interdependency, technologies, and
political situations. It has been stated "a real gap exists between the study of diplomacy and
the study of most of the rest of international relations" (Sharp, 1998: 46).
Most o f the standing literature agrees that diplomacy is in a decline, yet also agrees
that diplomacy maintains an importance within international relations (Sharp 1999, 40) .
Diplomacy within the U.S. Department o f State i s being challenged to adapt to these
changes as the American military is being used at a greater extent to take on traditional
diplomatic functions. This study will analyze t he particular challenges that U.S.
Ambassadors meet within their daily work and attempt to define their role within
international relations. In doing so we wil l have a better understanding of what their
current functions are. The methods used will be interviews conducted with former U.S.
ambassadors who served in developing countries.
These ambassadors will be chosen upon the criteria of the economic conditions in
their host country using the United Nations Human Development Index (UN HDI).
Economic disparities are becoming a critical factor within state relations; therefore this
study will mainly focus on diplomats who served in countries lower than "H igh Human
Development" on the UN HDI. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton recognizes that diplomacy is
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rapidly changing to include international development initiatives alongside the standing
traditional duties such as negotiations (Sharp and Wiseman, 2 00 7 : 56) . Ambassadors who
have worked within the context of a developing country will be able to provide the most
useful view of this new diplomatic direction.
To fully understand the role of Ambassadors, this thesis will also examine how they
respond to international crises and how their role shaped the U.S. response and furthering
relations with their host country. To do so, this study will look specifically at the crisis in
Rwanda in 1994 and how the role of Ambassador David Rawson affected the U.S. response
to the unfolding genocide. This will be done by using Allison's three-part model, which
includes the rational policy level, the bureaucratic processes, and the organizational
processes that form foreign policy decisions. This tool will provide a full overview of the
context in which the Rwandan genocide took place and break down the standard operating
procedures which ambassadors such as Rawson must work within. While the U.S. response
to such crises in the past has been labeled as "schizophrenic," Allison would argue that each
decision made is seen at the time as the most rational (1969: 692). Testing Allison's models
will help explain the lack of continuity on the part of the U.S. and what was the role of the
ambassador in one specific case study. The findings will also shed light on maj or events in
which diplomacy and international development were indistinguishable from each other,
as is the predicted direction of the future.
Today we see international development and the vague term of "nation building"
often being conducted by the American military. Many of the military missions currently
taking place in Afghanistan and Iraq are under the title of "nation building," yet this is a
term traditionally applied to the work of diplomats and the State Department. One
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prominent military figure with vast experience in managing such missions and conducting
diplomatic relations is General Anthony Zinni, the Unified Combatant Commander of the
U.S. Central Command from 1998 to 2001. By interviewing a former commander such as
Zinni we will gain an alternative perspective to the definition of "diplomacy" and see how
the military is able to take on more diplomatic duties, especially in lesser-developed
countries. The role of our modern military is important in understanding how the role of a
traditional diplomat has changed and how important international development is for U.S.
national foreign policy.
Currently the State Department and international development agencies such as the
United States Agency for International Development are facing drastic funding cuts (Lester,
2 0 1 1 : 1).1 Yet it is recognized that the United States' role in bridging economic gaps with
developing countries is crucial to sound diplomatic relations. The ambassador is the
traditional figure who conducts diplomatic relations, yet there is a large scholarship gap
that provides a firm understanding between the role of ambassadors and the greater
interactions between states. More so, the diplomat's role is increasingly being undertaken
by our military. Through interviews with former ambassadors and military commanders
and through the application of Allison's rational policy method to the case of the Rwandan
genocide, this study will fill in the existing gap in scholarship, give a clearer understanding
of the diplomat's role and the military's role in conducting diplomacy, and examine the role
that international development is taking within the United States' foreign relations.

1 On July 2 7, 2 0 1 1 the Kaiser Daily Global H ealth Policy reported that the H ouse Appropriations Committee
released the FY1 2 Foreign Relations Authorization Act that will slash State Department funding and foreign
aid. The bill decreased the State Department and related agencies' budgets by $3.9 billion. It specifically cuts
$488 million from USAID's budget (Kaiser Daily Global H ealth Policy Report, 201 1).
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This thesis will first examine the existing literature and recognize the existing gap of
a true understanding of American diplomacy within international relations. Next will be the
application of Allison's rational policy analysis to the 1994 Rwandan genocide and a study
of how our U.S. foreign policy was formed based on decisions by President Clinton,
Ambassador Rawson, and other actors within the State Department. After understanding
the structure and operating procedures of U.S. ambassadors this thesis will use multiple
interviews with former ambassadors to examine the current role of diplomats and how
traditional diplomacy is changing, especially in regards to the importance of economic and
social development. The final chapter of this thesis will continue looking at changes within
the traditional diplomatic structure, focusing on the shift of nation-building activities from
the U.S. State Department to the American military.
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Chapter 1: Literature Review

The history of diplomacy is a very comprehensive category of research. M uch of the
literature gives chronological timelines of important historical events, treaties, and figures
that detail how diplomacy has formed into what is in our present day. Stearns begins his
review of diplomatic history with Italy, the first country to establish the position of a
professional diplomat (2004: 140). For the purpose of this study, however, many of these
marker details will not be discussed, although they can easily be found in much of the
existing research. What are harder to find are broader connections between the idea of
diplomacy and the events that have shaped it. Sharp concurs that much of the available
literature has "dutiful" historical reviews, but notes that these "are usually self-contained
affairs, not part of the main argument (19 9 7 : 6 1 5) . So while examples of specific diplomats
and treaties are important, this literature review will focus on the broader concepts that
have been noted within the current research.
Nicolson makes these connections through his own historical review in Diplomacy.
The purpose of his review is show that diplomacy is an "essential element" to maintaining
relations between all countries and that diplomacy is not a mere invention of a specific
political system ( 1 9 8 8 : 39). While he does list important historical events, Nicolson devotes
a large portion of his literature to providing historical examples of what he believes make a
good diplomat. H e cites seven "diplomatic virtues" that include truthfulness, good temper,
precision, patience, calm, modesty, and loyalty. Stearns also includes historical examples of
how these diplomatic qualities have been the precedent for all diplomats since the very
start. H e uses Benjamin Franklin, who is considered to be the United States' first diplomat,
as an example.
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Stearns' literature suggests that Franklin set the precedent for our modern
expectations of the qualities of a diplomat. Franklin was an expert on the culture,
government, and societal norms of France and studied the language until he was fluent. H e
understood the problems the French government faced and the current issues that had to
be dealt with. A deep and comprehensive knowledge such as this is why Americans expect
our modern diplomats to study languages and pass an examination, such as the Foreign
Service Test, which demands broad knowledge of international affairs. Sir Nicolas agrees,
and writes that diplomats, or at the minimum the diplomat's staff, should "have studied the
local traditions and character" of the country to which they represent their country (Lilley,
2 004: 3 0 3 ) . H ere we can trace our current expectations of diplomats all the way to the
qualities and actions of our nation's very first one.
These expectations we have of our diplomats are very high. Much of the literature
cites examples of the difficulties they must face professionally. Stearns states that
diplomats must be both a symbol of their country and simultaneously a direct
representative of his chief of state (1973: 1 56) . Diplomats are in a constant balancing act.
Sharp adds that first and foremost, a diplomat is a symbol of his or her country. Often the
role of the diplomat is viewed as a representative always negotiating for peace, yet Sharp
corrects this idea by stating that diplomats understand there is much more to their work
than the sole focus of advancing their own state's agenda ( 1 9 9 7 : 4 1 ) . They are committed
both to peace and to saving their own leaders from themselves. Often they have difficulty
when their leaders do not want what the diplomat believes is best for the relations with the
country they work in.
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Often diplomats see themselves as more aware than those they represent, which
present tensions within their profession (Sharp, 1997: 6 1 6, 6 2 7) . Seldom are there clear
definitions for the exact role of a diplomat in common situations such as this, allowing for
broad and often unclear duties. This is magnified by a fact both Sharp and Wiseman
present; that each diplomatic situation is unique and different from every other (2 007: 41).
The j ob a diplomat must carry out wil l be defined by the political, social, and economic
context in which they are working (Sharp and Wiseman, 2 007: 56). The literature presents
the challenges from the ever-changing international landscape of which diplomats are at
both times the glue and the actors who must push the world forward.
A diplomat's role, while difficult, is said by many to be central to international
relations. Sharp describes it as "an integral part of the minimal conditions securing the
existence of international society" (Sharp, 1997: 618). It is the heart and the glue of how
the world operates within the established international systems. Diplomats see themselves
as "the steadying influence" in a fast-paced world where decisions are often made based on
short-term goals. Diplomats are vital because they, in theory, stand as a voice for the long
term goals (Sharp, 1 99 7 : 627). By knowing the culture, history, and operations of his or her
resident country, like Nicolson and many other authors promote, a diplomat can more
readily recognize what these goals are. Sharp's literature presents the role of the diplomat
as maintaining relations between different actors who are "characterized by very thin
social contexts" (Sharp, 1999: 2 1 ).
Today the importance of diplomacy within international relations is strongly
critiqued and questioned, adding another broad area of research. The nation-building and
reconstruction process happening in Iraq provides a strong example of this. These duties
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are the traditional j ob carried out by diplomats and others from the State Department. In
March of 2002 the State Department created a "Future of Iraq Project" that involves
seventeen different contributing groups and suggested activities that would promote a
p eaceful Iraq. This proj ect identified its main challenge as to "transform these activities
into a coherent and unified effort and to ensure that policy formulated in Washington is
accepted internationally and effectively implement in Iraq" (Pickering and Schlesinger,
2 0 0 3 : 2 3) . The State Department has made efforts to outline what they would do in our
situation in Iraq.
H owever, according to former United States Ambassador Thomas Pickering, the
Department of Defense is the department that is leading the post-war governance in Iraq.
This shift in roles does not seem surprising given that the overall solution from the State
Department was a theoretical proj ect with vague goals and challenges. Here we can see the
j ob of peacekeeping and nation building shift from the State Department and its traditional
diplomacy towards a shared inter-departmental discussion between the Pentagon and the
State Department. However, Pickering and Schlesinger hardly mention the State
Department's plan within this study, suggesting that the role of diplomats in our modern
military presence is decreasing (2 003: 28).
Priest focuses on the role of U.S. military regional commanders-in-chief and their
extraordinary access to resources and how their missions are increasingly focused on
diplomatic missions. One chapter of her study examines Commander Zinni, a Unified
Combatant Commander of U.S. Central Command who served from 1998 to 2 0 0 1, who
became a pseudo-diplomat within his region, informally ranked higher than U.S.
ambassadors. General Zinni recognized the importance of understanding a country's
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culture and how culture defined politics, just as a well-trained diplomat would. Zinni also
recognized the importance of food relief, medical work, and economic assistance and
refused to work on a mission unless the social structure of a tribe or a community was well
understood (Priest, 2 003 : 6 1- 77). This literature gives a strong example of how the military
is increasingly heading missions and proj ects, such as nation building and development
that are traditionally reserved for the U.S. State Department.
The act of diplomacy being carried out by non- diplomats, such as the military, is
part of the reason Sharp argues that the importance of diplomacy is in decline. More
specifically, the role of the traditional diplomat is becoming less obvious as our nation uses
the military and even humanitarian agencies to conduct diplomacy. Stearns also agrees,
recognizing that we cannot continue to use diplomacy in the traditional sense (1996:10).
Stearns suggests that the Foreign Service change by shifting its focus from "geographic and
functional bureaus" to developing more area specialization and foreign language skill
( 1 9 7 3 : 6 5) . Such an emphasis again refers to the important skills and qualities Nicolson
presents in his study that is traced throughout much of the existing research.
The argument that diplomats do not posses the appropriate skills or qualities makes
the central argument of a cause for their irrelevancy. Nicolson suggests that, "the art of
negotiation requires a combination of certain special qualities which are not always to be
found in the ordinary politician, nor even in the ordinary man" (Sharp, 1999: 5). Stearns
also agrees that the best diplomats are "distinguished by their qualities rather than by their
skills," suggesting people are born diplomats; the necessary qualities cannot be learned
(Stearns, 1 9 73: 1 54) . If such a unique set of skills is needed, but not easily found or
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acquired, then perhaps many of our diplomats are naturally lacking the necessary
foundations for this profession.
As the qualities and skills of a diplomat are limited, the problems that must be faced
using these certain qualities are increasing. Much of the current literature states that
problems diplomats must face are too complicated to be answered with the traditional
format. These problems include AIDS, terrorism, immigration and human rights, which
Stearns argues can only be addressed when states find new ways to collaborate on
solutions (1996: 1 7) . Finding these difficult solutions will require a "greater diplomatic
effort," meaning diplomacy must change and adapt to meet the modern needs of our world
(Stearns, 1 9 9 6 : 1 8) .
Some researchers, such a s Cooper, believe that international issues once dealt with
by diplomats are not just increasing but are completely changing. Because of globalization,
diplomats must focus not j ust on political issues, but also those of trade and economics. Our
cooperation with other nations includes humanitarian assistance during complex
emergencies and natural disasters.
One complex issue that defines the status and power of all countries is the level of
economic development growth. Development is becoming increasingly important.
Secretary of State Hilary Clinton published the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and
Development Review in July of 2 009. This publication reviewed the State Department and
USAID and sought to coordinate U.S. diplomacy and development efforts, recognizing that
diplomacy and development often overlap and should begin to "mutually reinforce" each
other (2 0 0 9 : 14) . Clinton discusses the importance of recognizing how development and
diplomacy fit together.
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Clinton first recognizes that development goals are often reached through
diplomatic procedures. To increase the compatibility of these two areas, she focuses her
report on three areas. First she suggests how to modernize and coordinate diplomacy
between multiple U.S. governmental agencies, how to make development proj ects
sustainable and have lasting results, and third how to create a stronger partnership
between development and diplomacy (Clinton, 2 0 1 0: 14). Clinton, in accord with Sharp and
other scholars who understand the necessary adaptability of diplomats, states that,
"although traditional diplomacy will always be critical to advancing the United States'
agenda, it is not enough" to achieve her three defined goals. One example she gives is how,
in our current times, a diplomat is likely to meet with a tribal elder in a rural village as their
foreign counterpart, and the traditional formalities of pinstriped suits will be replaced with
cargo pants (Clinton, 2 0 1 0 : 15).
Clinton goes on to impress through her report that American citizens must come to
understand that spending tax dollars on development and diplomacy is in their best
interest, especially when used in developing countries such as the ones many of the
ambassadors interviewed above worked in. Diplomacy and development is crucial in
countries that are deemed as fragile or conflict zones (Clinton, 2 0 1 0 : 2 3) . It is becoming
ever apparent and ever crucial that development should be at the forefront of U.S.
diplomacy in both establishing and forwarding beneficial relations with other countries to
create a more stable and peaceful world.
Sharp warns against this expectation that governments have the responsibility to
solve problems such as these. He suggests this causes a "dangerous cycle" in which
governments begin international projects only to find that there are not enough resources
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to continue them. Often this type of proj ect is placed under the diplomat's responsibility
and they are subj ected to other policies that should not be within their roles (Sharp, 1997:
6 1 0).
Domestic issues are increasingly becoming blurred and integrated with
international issues. Stearns believes these two spheres are more integrated than ever,
because our foreign policy must operate within American commitments, priorities, and
initiatives set in place through domestic politics ( 1 9 7 3 : 1 65). Along with Stearns' suggested
steps, Jeffrey Cooper's research suggests that diplomats will have to learn to work and even
negotiate with private organizations that operate outside of the traditional governmental
structures ( 1 9 9 9 : 2 2) . Here we see the emergence of what Andrew Cooper calls "double
edged diplomacy," where each act by a diplomat must be in respect to both international
and domestic politics (1997 /1998: 1 78) .
The current literature shows that adapting to these increasing and more complex
demands is difficult. Yet it is inevitable that unpredictable political, social, and
technological developments occur (Sharp, 1999: 39). If diplomats cannot adapt, they
become irrelevant. Situations such as the Iraq post-conflict resolution are becoming more
common, where a non-traditional diplomacy is used. If the State Department is not needed,
then traditional diplomats working under this agency are not needed. Some of the
literature explores how this perceived irrelevancy has come about.
Sharp believes that diplomats contribute to their own irrelevancy. The "aura of a
'professional mystique' and 'defensive self-confidence' only isolates the profession (1999 :
3 1) . They seemingly hide behind pointless ceremonies and pretentious acts to support
their reputations. Sharp and Wiseman justify such acts and remind us that "the thing to
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remember is that the cloak of state and diplomatic ceremony is worn lightly and provides
shelter for what is going on beneath" (2 007: 2 66). Nicolson also j ustifies these same acts by
saying that diplomats use this "cloak" to form "solidarity and establish certain tacit
standards which they all respect" (1988: 44) .
H owever, Cooper acknowledges that there are many who think diplomats are far
removed from the real problems and their solutions (1997 /1998: 174) . Nicolson's idea of a
"diplomatic language" supports this view. Nicolson describes diplomatic language as the
"conventional form of communication that maintains an atmosphere of calm, while
enabling statesmen to convey serious warnings to each other" (1988: 1 38). This common
language among diplomats used to be Latin, then French, and now includes English. Yet no
matter what the language, even the syntax of phrases was altered so that the public could
not understand. Nicolson also argues that the public is uninformed as to the real issues
diplomats deal with, because these issues are too complex. This discrepancy between
diplomats and the people they represent only adds to the support that diplomats are out of
touch with the public and the "real world."
Cooper believes that the duties of diplomats are not important now that
international affairs are operated within bureaucracy and with improved communications
through technology (1999: 2 1) . Stearns touches on the problems found in bureaucracy; it
can become so complicated that internal communications suffer, causing confusion and
personnel issues. If diplomats are expected to change and adapt, reforms must first start
internally (Stearns, 1 9 7 3 : 163). However, there are no concrete examples of change or
reform that the State Department could undertake in order to tangibly change their
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operations. It is only acknowledged that reform must happen, but no specifics are cited in
the current literature.
Cooper argues that diplomats are not relevant anymore because the required duties
are no longer suited to how international relations is conducted. He states that diplomacy
is irrelevant. The political and strategic matters diplomats work for are no longer the heart
of relations between countries (Cooper, 1999: 20). In fact these improved communications
now allow domestic actors to communicate directly with international organizations or
even foreign heads of states themselves, completely bypassing the diplomat. Yet this is not
a new problem. Nicolson recognizes the technology of his time, which includes the steam
engine, telegraph, airplane, and telephone, as substantially modifying the practice of
traditional diplomacy (1988: 38).
Even though many others explore the decline of diplomacy, much of the same
research still lists examples of why diplomacy is needed. Diplomats are needed for
important in-person contacts with officials such as the heads of states and Ministry of
Foreign Affairs contacts and to conduct meetings and conferences with these and other
foreign affairs actors. Cooper seems to be in line with Sharp when he says that the "classic
functions" of diplomacy, such as negotiation and representation, will continue, but the
"form and substance will be significantly altered (1999: 2 1) . These arguments comport
with most of the other authors who recognize that diplomacy must change and adapt.
While Sharp and Wiseman use globalization as a cause of the decaying relevancy in
diplomacy, Cooper takes the opposite stance, he states that "diplomacy appears to have
risen in importance" as a force that could be able to work within our world's increasing
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interdependency (1997 /1998: 175). These contrasting authors provide examples of the
differing opinions and views of the diplomat.
Nicolson even supports the role of a diplomat, arguing that, "it will always be
desirable that the foreign policy of any great country should be carried out by professionals
trained in their b usiness." However, this is not always the case of many diplomats who are
politically appointed as ambassadors. It would be imperative to research the effectiveness
of a career-long diplomat versus a president's political appointment. This particular
literature suggests that an appointed diplomat acts "out of vanity and owing to the
shortness of his tenure to seek for rapid successes . . . and has not acquired the humane and
tolerant disbelief which is the product of a long diplomatic career" (Nicolson, 1988: 39).
A small portion of the existing literature provides exam pl es of such a situation. Paul
Cellucci, a politically appointed ambassador to Canada, provides an example of the
particular difficulties many political appointees face. Cellucci is described as having a steep
learning curve when entering diplomacy, suggesting that he was not an expert as
prescribed by many others. Cellucci is also described as not having "any instincts" or
"grounding in foreign affairs," suggesting his shortcomings as a diplomat was a cause of his
lack of necessary qualities (Harper, 2003: 7 1 8) . He did not follow many of the ceremonial
gestures that diplomats value and respect. Some argued he could not find a good balance
between representing the United States while acting diplomatically to Canada, yet others
believe him to be instrumental in certain negotiations between the two nations (Harper,
2 0 0 3 : 7 1 8) .
This specific example of Cellucci as a diplomat provides insights into how the
routine actions and duties of a diplomat can be viewed with different opinions. This
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literature is rare because it follows an appointed diplomat, which can be analyzed
differently than a career diplomat. Some literature does exist on career diplomats in the
form of memoirs. One comprehensive memoir is former U.S. ambassador to Mexico, Jeffrey
Davidow's, who had a 3 5-year long career within the Foreign Service.
In Davidow's memoir, he recounts his four years as a diplomat to Mexico. It includes
many of the complex issues that other authors have stated diplomats must face, such as the
drug trade, immigration, political unrest, and free trade. It also includes typical meetings
with Mexican officials, travels around the country to better understand the culture and
local customs, and cites Davidow's knowledge of the foreign language, suggesting he was a
good diplomat based on the qualities traced back to Benjamin Franklin. His memoir also
provides a real-life view of the challenge diplomats face when balancing the United States'
position on certain matters with their own personal views as well as j uggling U.S. domestic
politics when being p hysically removed from it (Davidow, 2 00 4 : 1 - 2 50).
Other memoirs like Davidow's exist, including Ambassador James Lilley's
experience in China, Joseph Wilson's experience in Iraq, and Richard Holbrooke's
experience in Eastern Europe. What can be taken from this literature are anecdotal
discussions of the ambassador and his diplomatic life. Most of the existing literature only
focuses on high-profile ambassadors, often who have been involved in a particular tragedy
or a controversial policy. Research is lacking on substantial examples of lesser-profile
ambassadors but would be invaluable to examine how diplomacy is carried out daily,
helping to better define its role, importance, and relevancy within international relations
today.
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Another need for more comprehensive research is the ambiguity of the definition of
diplomacy. Sharp does not define diplomacy by negotiation, but rather by representation.
Yet he states in some of his research that representation in its single term has three
branches: the sovereign, the diplomat as a person, and the diplomat in the capacity as the
sovereign (Sharp, 1 9 9 7 : 6 1 1). He even recognizes that these definitions within the
definition of representation have changed and become more blurred and complex along
with the discrepancy of the multiple ways experts and others within the field define
diplomacy - a fact he believes is a part of the problem and must resolved. Sharp believes
there are two ways to define diplomacy: broadly and narrowly. If diplomacy is simply
representation, or economic bargaining, or conflict resolution, it must be recognized and
defined as such.
Sharp and Wiseman agree that diplomacy is simply the art of negotiating (2 007:56) .
Nicolson establishes this same definition in his earlier research and warns against
confusing diplomacy as a synonym for "foreign affairs," including foreign policy (1988: xiii,
1 38).
This need for a strong and clear definition of diplomacy is found throughout the
existing literature. Nicolson warns that the term "diplomacy" is consistently misused. He
even goes so far as to suggest that the confusion with the conduct of foreign affairs stems
from confusing the roles of what a diplomat should be carrying out, or falsely mixing policy
with negotiation. Many use diplomacy to define both the "framing of foreign policy and its
execution" which is a problem (Nicolson, 1988: 3). Yet even Nicolson's own definition of
diplomacy seems somewhat vague. Nicolson describes diplomacy as "th e application of
intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of
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independent states" (1988: 1 2 2) . This is a very encompassing definition, but does not
specify what the "official relations" consist of.
It is established that more research in the areas of specific diplomatic lives and a
clear definition of the term "diplomacy" would be valuable. Even Sharp recognizes that
research on diplomacy is very limited and not even considered in some maj or j ournals such
as Diplomatic History (1999 : 44 ). He states, "The study of diplomacy remains marginal"
(Sharp, 1999: 3 4) . For something considered by most of the primary authors as central to
international relations, diplomacy still remains poorly understood.
It is understood, however, that diplomacy has been historically central to the
world's affairs, and many of the prominent researchers believe it should remain central. Yet
with increasing technology and complex problems that are harder to solve, it is arguable
that the role of diplomats are becoming less and less relevant. The United States has
examples of the military overstepping the traditional role of diplomacy carried out by the
State Department and the tensions found among the existing diplomatic practices both by
career-long and politically appointed ambassadors. Yet even through all of this, it is
recognized that "diplomats and their trade remain important not j ust because of the
residue of an age-old professional legacy but because of the value of their everyday
activities in the contemporary world" (Cooper, 1997 /1998: 178). It is imperative to study
these everyday activities among a more diverse pool of diplomats than what the existing
research offers. By looking at the fundamentals of the practice of diplomacy today, it can be
defined and its importance carved out in the changing and unpredictable arena of
international relations. This will contribute to our understanding of the role of diplomacy
in our modern era.
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Focusing on the specific research of the 1994 Rwandan genocide as a crisis in which
a diplomatic response was necessary, much literature exists studying the U.S. response of
non-action to the situation. This thesis will use Graham Allison's three models to examine
the Rwandan genocide. To briefly summarize Allison, his research three structured models
to analyze the Cuban missile crisis and what decisions were made based on the dynamics
among the three levels. Allison first looks at the United States' response to the Soviet
emplacement of missiles in Cuba by analyzing each decision, such as the blockade, the last
resort of an invasion, and even theoretical decisions including the decision to not act.
Allison argues that the different national actors, diplomatic pressures, and routines call for
a wider analysis of foreign policy decision making. Allison looks at multiple decision
makers and influences during the Cuban M issile Crisis from the National Security Council to
the Treasury. H e recognizes the importance of routines and regulations when our
bureaucracies are dealing with certain situations, and overall he provides an example of
how to include these multiple facets in examining the United States foreign policy in
regards to the Cuban Missile Crisis (Allison, 1969).
While Allison's three-model theory helps to fol low the development of foreign policy
decisions, other scholars such as Stephen Krasner believe that it is ultimately the President,
and only the President, who decides what actions the U.S. will take. Krasner believes giving
credit to the individuals within and procedures of a bureaucracy unjustly relieve the
President of his specific responsibilities. He argues that especially in regards to foreign
policy the President is the sole and final actor ( 1 9 7 2 : 1 68). Krasner does not believe a
three-model analysis such as Allison's is needed, but rather the focus should remain on the
actions of the President, as he is the final decision-maker.
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However, Allison's models and similar ones that analyze bureaucratic politics have
widely been used to explain the Cuban Missile Crisis, American foreign policy in Vietnam,
the Suez crisis, and others. (Krasner, 197 2 : 160). The impact Allison has left in the field of
international relations is large, for his research proves that there is predictability and a
structure to analyzing foreign policy that is testable (Allison, 1969: 690). The President is
equipped with a large cabinet of advisors and numerous agencies that are designed to help
form national decisions. While the President is ultimately the final decision-maker,
Allison's model has helped the academic field to better understand the possible influences
and p erspectives the President was exposed to while making decisions. It is a natural
transition to test Allison's model on more recent international events such as the Rwandan
Genocide.
Powers argues U.S. diplomacy failed in Rwanda. First, U.S. representatives put too
much trust in the Rwandan government, who were secretly planning the genocide. Second,
due to the culture of the State Department, American diplomats did not want to intervene
in the escalating violence for fear it would disrupt the peace process and Arusha Accords.
Therefore they completely avoided confrontation when it was needed (Power, 2 0 0 2 : 3 3 8) .
Alan Kuperman believes that keeping peaceful relations i s the primary role of the
ambassador and of diplomacy. He says "To avert such violence over the long-term, there is
no alternative to the time-consuming business of diplomacy and negotiation" (2 000: 1 1 2 ) .
These scholars establish that diplomacy was indeed important within U.S. relations with
Rwanda, an importance that can be further tested with Allison's three models.
It is recognized by many scholars that Allison's three-model test was an important
milestone for studying the bureaucratic influence on U.S. foreign policy that extends our
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understanding from the narrow, single-actor understanding that was previously accepted
(Bendor & Thomas, 1 9 9 2 : 3 0 2 ; Wagner, 197 4:43 7) . Mitchell and Massoud analyze how
decisions were made during the Iraq War by integrating individual and bureaucratic
analyses. M itchell and Massoud both agree that an integrative model, like the one Allison
presents, is especially important when looking at the decision-making process during a
crisis. (2009: 2 67). Although Allison's method is arguably outdated for our science, its
comprehensive approach to different levels of analysis are still used and respected.
Bendor and Hammond, while accepting the worth of Allison's study to the
advancement of the field, re-analyze the nature of each of Allison's three models,
concluding that some of the models' assumptions are ambiguous. They especially criticize
Allison's second and third models as not accounting for complex human behavior and being
too complicated to accurately apply to a case study. Instead of Allison's models helping give
a better understanding of U.S. foreign policy, Bendor and Hammond go so far as to say that
Allison's models could mislead people's understanding of how bureaucracies operate and
how U.S. foreign policy is made (199 2 : 3 2 1 ). This existing literature provides a foundation
for analyzing foreign policy decisions and how the specific case of the Rwandan genocide
helps define diplomacy and its role in the broader view of international relations.
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Chapter 2: Allison's Application for United States Foreign Policy towards Rwanda

Introduction
U nited States ambassadors play a central role within international relations and the
conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Often ambassadors are thought of as the primary
representative of the United States, expected to be an expert in the host country's culture
and politics, and serve as a direct source of information for the President (Rawson,
telephone interview) . Therefore ambassadors should ostensibly have a distinctive part in
the formation of U.S. foreign policy. This formation, as Graham Allison argues, is based on
integrative and rational policy decisions on multiple levels within the U.S. government.
These levels can be broken down into three models: the national level, where the most
"rational" choice is chosen, the organizational model, which focuses on the standard
operating p rocedures that must be followed, and the bureaucratic politics model where
competing views from within a single department vie for personal agendas (Allison, 1969:
690).
This study will look at a different, large event within international relations: The
Rwandan genocide in 1994. U.S. foreign policy has been described as "schizophrenic" and
this description is especially clear when applied to the U.S. response to the crisis in Rwanda
(Allison, 1969: 692). The response was practically nothing; President Bill Clinton never
once convened a meeting with his advisors to discuss possible options in Rwanda. Yet
Rwanda is now considered to be "the fastest, most efficient killing spree of the 2 0th
century" (Power, 2 0 0 2: 3 34) .
There was a U.S. ambassador stationed in the Rwandan capital, Kigali, with a full
embassy staff with on-the-ground intelligence of the unfolding violence in 1994. Yet in the
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literature on the Rwandan genocide and the role of the U.S. Ambassador David Rawson is
rarely even brought up. Often the literature only mentions President Clinton's failure to act
and the United Nations' failed peacekeeping mission describe how the United States and
the international community allowed such a horrific, arguably preventable event to occur.
There is a lack of analysis on the United States' primary representative, negotiator, and on
the-ground information source: the ambassador. If the ambassador is central to the
conduct of international relations and implementation of U.S. foreign policy, then their
influence must be understood.
Looking at the case of the Rwandan genocide, this study will use Allison's three
models to study President Clinton's choice of non-action and how it was chosen as the best
policy, the strengths and limitations of the State Department in influencing the U.S.
response, and finally the interactions and personal agendas of individuals who were
involved in the decision-making. Along with this case study an interview with former
ambassador David Rawson will be used to more completely understand the role of the
ambassador, specifically. Testing Allison's three models will provide a comprehensive
analysis of the multiple parties, views, and influences that led to the U.S. foreign policy
decision regarding Rwanda. It will provide a clearer understanding of the already
established importance of diplomacy within international relations, especially when
looking at such a crisis as the Rwandan Genocide. An interview with former ambassador
David Rawson will complement Allison's method to see how his role impacted U.S. foreign
policy and what the consequences these decisions had on Rwanda.
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Methodology
This research will be a case study, using previous studies on the Rwandan genocide,
the Clinton administration, and the role of the State Department as the primary resources.
U.S. D epartment of State cables will also be used. Previous interviews conducted by
Frontline will be analyzed as they provide a wide range of questions to which the
responses of multiple people within the State Department are recorded, verbatim. A
telephone interview with the former ambassador to Rwanda, Ambassador David Rawson,
will complement these existing interviews.2 These questions were decided upon in order to
better understand Ambassador Rawson's role in Rwanda, what standard operating
procedures were followed, and how an individual such as himself fit into the large
bureaucracy of the State Department. These questions will help develop a stronger source
of data for M odel I I, the one most criticized for being too vague. Additionally, these
questions will add insight into the U.S. on-the-ground representative who represents both
the U.S. President and the American people in carrying out foreign policy. Many of these
questions have not been asked to Ambassador Rawson in previous public interviews and
will advance the existing research as well as help advance this case study.
Background
First it is important to understand some background of the Rwandan genocide and
the context of the state of the international politics at the time. This will allow a thorough
analysis of Allison's first model and the rational-policy choice at the national level.
Samantha Power provides what is perhaps the most detailed review of the Rwandan
Genocide and h ow the decisions and context of the international community influenced
2

This research protocol was approved by the Eastern Illinois University I nstitutional Review Board on
November 1 8, 2 0 1 1 . File Number: 1 1 - 1 5 6.
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decisions (2 0 0 2). Rwanda was comprised of two main ethnic groups: the Hutus and the
Tutsis. When Rwanda gained its independence in 1961 the Hutus controlled the
government and began discriminating against and killing Tutsis, causing half of the Tutsi
population to flee into bordering countries (Kuperman, 2 0 0 0 : 100). Over the years these
displaced Tutsis invaded Rwanda, trying to take back their country from the Hutus. In 1993
the Arusha Accords were signed; an agreement that both sides would cease-fire and the
Hutus would govern with opposition parties and a Tutsi minority. United Nations
peacekeepers were sent to ensure that both the Hutus and the Tutsis would fulfill the
agreement. However on April 6th, 1994, Hutu extremists shot the Rwandan and the Burundi
Presidents' plane down, immediately starting a systematic genocide (Power 2 0 0 2 : 3 2 9) .
Through this brief history o f the main foundations for the Rwandan Genocide,
multiple warnings were issued to the United States and President Clinton of ensuing large
scale violence. These warnings came from Human Rights Watch, the State Department, and
even the Central Intelligence Agency (Power, 2 0 0 2 : 3 3 0) . Yet these warnings were largely
ignored, not because of illegitimacy or unbelief, but because of the context of the U.S.
foreign policy.
Application of Model I
To apply Allison's first model this study will look at President Clinton and his
administration's overall attitude toward the events in Rwanda and their decision-making
process. At the time violence began in Rwanda and the U.S. government began receiving
warnings of an escalating situation, a response seemed unable to do. At this same time, the
United States was involved in failing missions in Bosnia and in Somalia where the missions
seemed very similar to the humanitarian mission that Rwanda was demanding (Power,
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2 0 0 2 : 3 40) In the other African country of Somalia the United States had already
experienced military casualties and a failed peacekeeping mission (Burkhalter, 1994: 44 ). It
is easy to understand that the administration did not want to put the U.S. into another
failing mission, and believed they were learning lessons from the previous two
interventions. Straus describes the Clinton administration has having "no appetite" for
another humanitarian effort (Strauss, 2006: 48) . It seems the violence in Rwanda came at a
poor time for the United States to believe in a successful mission.
The overall administration is described by Richard Hass as lacking a coherent
framework in foreign policy (1997: 1 1 4) . Even more, Burkhalter describes President
Clinton as only interested in foreign affairs when the U.S. was directly affected, and Rwanda
was viewed as having no direct affect on the U.S. (1994: 46). In fact, Clinton viewed most of
the world as having little effect on the U.S. Barry Schweid describes Clinton's attitude for
foreign policy as "an approach to the world that makes few demands on his secretary of
state." (1994: 1 3 8) . President Clinton was even criticized by Henry Kissinger as making
random, unrelated decisions when responding to crises (2 0 1 0 : 2 68) . Having a weak
structure to foreign policy and the personal attitudes of the President help explain why
Clinton chose not to respond to Rwanda.
However, Dumbrell looks at Clinton's foreign policy legacy over a longer period and
believes that it was not as sporadic and unclear as many other scholars have concluded.
Dumbrell suggests that Clinton focused his decisions on his mission of pushing "economics
first." Because of this primary agenda Clinton formed his foreign policy around the ideas of
globalization and free trade. He believed U.S. interests abroad should lie with economic
interests, not humanitarian ones. Dumbrell also examines the difficult time period during
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which Clinton was president. International politics had shifted from a Cold War setting into
one where the United States was the new hegemonic leader, and Dumbrell reminds us that
this was not an easy shift. President Clinton, according to this research, was simply making
decisions based on the state of domestic and international politics of the 1990s (2 0 1 0:
2 69).
President Clinton did create a framework for U.S. foreign policy with the United
Nations by introducing a directive of guidelines for how the United States would become
involved in U.N. missions. This directive was introduced on May 5th while the genocide in
Rwanda was taking place. This directive, called the Presidential Decision Directive 2 5,
stated that any U.S. involvement must be to advance American interests (Burkhalter, 1994:
48) . Rwanda, as stated before, was not considered an American interest.
Looking at how the State Department operated within Rwanda, examining the
embassy in Kigali will help understand State Department operations. The embassy
established in Kigali was a small mission, due to the low interest the U.S. had in Rwanda.
According to the National Security Archives this embassy was lacking a political officer, a
position that analyzes the political events taking place and how the U.S. should respond, a
C IA representative, and a defense attache. Ambassador Rawson and Deputy Chief of
Mission Joyce Leader did most of this work (Ferroggiaro, 2 004). The amount of resources
given to help formulate U.S. foreign policy is based on the U.S. interests toward the country,
and even George M oose admits that Rwanda was no where near a top priority for the U.S.
(Frontline, 2 0 0 3 ) .
Even more factors l e d to the disinterest of American leadership. While the United
Nations was calling for U.S. involvement in Rwanda and for the U.S. to send or help pay for
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troops, the overall attitude towards U.N. peacekeeping was very skeptical. In fact the
United States had been invested in a peace process in Rwanda for over three years, starting
in 1 9 9 1 (Power, 2 0 0 2 : 34 7) . The U.S. Congress was not going to support another
peacekeeping mission when our country already owed half a billion dollars in dues and
peacekeeping costs already (Power, 2 0 0 2 : 341). Peacekeeping at the time was looked upon
as too idealistic and ineffective, especially when the Belgium U.N. peacekeepers were so
easily killed at the beginning of the violence in Rwanda. Michael Doyle and Nicholas
Sambanis provide the steps for effective peacekeeping, but ultimately note that low levels
of economic development may motivate actors to violence, no matter how strong the
p eacekeeping mission (2000: 782). Not even the U.N. agreed to the requests from the
Commander of U.N. peacekeeping forces in Rwanda (Power, 2 0 0 2 : 342). Both in the U.S.
and internationally, another peacekeeping mission seemed to be thought of as too
redundant with less-than-desirable outcomes.
Application of Model II
With the political situation and the personal views of President Clinton in place we
can move on to Allison's second model of the organizational processes. We would
anticipate that the decisions made in response to the situation in Rwanda were affected by
the standard operating procedures that are followed within the State Department. For the
Rwandan genocide, this study will look at the State Department and how their own
standard operating procedures guide the flow of information and decision-making.
Ambassador David Rawson, looking back on the event, describes that himself and the State
Department were "very heavily invested" in bringing peace to Rwanda. In his interview,
Rawson describes his main obj ectives, given to him by Washington, were to push forward
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the Arusha Accords for peace (Rawson, 2 0 1 1). Yet it is recognized that other effective
measures could have taken place. For example, the U.S. could have jammed the radio
broadcasts that were forwarding the ethnic killing, yet the Pentagon deemed it illegal.
(Burkhalter, 1994: 51). Power includes that this push for peace was pursued "almost
blindly" because they were simply the orders that must be followed.
Ambassador Rawson describes his role in pushing for peace by providing technical
expertise to the two conflicting parties in Rwanda and giving funding to the organizations
that supported this peace negotiation. A part of this push for peace comes from the
expectation that the Ambassador will serve as both a representative of the President of the
United States and of the policies of the current administration. Rawson explains that every
ambassador understands this role, as the first thing any ambassador receives is a letter
from the president's administration stating that their primary concern is the protection of
American citizens and the promotion of American interests. Ambassadors understand that
they must do what they are asked and expected to do, which is to keep regular contact with
Washington, accurately report on situations within the host country, and recommend to
Washington what is appropriate for U.S. foreign policy. With this foundation understood,
Rawson served with these expectations and precisely followed his instructions. (Rawson,
2 0 1 1) .
When violence started i n 1994 the immediate reactions o f Ambassador Rawson and
the international community were to keep pushing for a peace agreement. Even when a
different solution or could have been considered, the State Department followed its own
precedent and kept pushing for the goal they had already set. Even after Rawson and all
Americans had been evacuated and the situation in Rwanda was fully understood, the
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response was still to create a peacekeeping force (Frontline, 2 003). This shows the attitude
within the State Department and the drive of those carrying out U.S. foreign policy to
achieve the goal and follow the instructions that have been given, even if it becomes a blind
and worthless fight. This standard operating procedure shaped a failed U.S. foreign
response to Rwanda, and could not allow other solutions to be explored.
Power briefly describes the actions of U.S. Ambassador Rawson immediately after
the Rwandan President's plane was shot down on April 6, 1 994. While the Ambassador had
sent many messages and warnings of increased tensions, the morning after the plane was
attacked h e decided to leave the country and suggested that all U.S. personnel be
evacuated. H e is quoted as thinking primarily of Americans and his first decision made in
response to the Hutu violence was to evacuate our citizens (Frontline, 2 0 0 3) .
In a symbolic gesture, Ambassador Rawson left Rwanda i n the very last car, after
everyone else had gone before him. In response to leaving, along with the deputy, in the
last car out of Kigali Ambassador Rawson replied emphatically, "That's what you do"
(Rawson, 2 0 1 1) . This signified a successful evacuation and was promoted and hailed as
such by the State Department, even though thirty-five U.S. personnel were killed during
these three days (Power, 2 0 0 2 : 3 52). Here we see that the State Department was content,
even with losing some personnel, because the standard operating procedures were
properly followed to a ceremonious degree. In an interview, Ambassador Rawson recalls
how he was carrying out the policies that were given to him and was constantly aware of
his role as an official of the U.S. government. He says, "There had to be a very close focus on
what it is we [were] supposed to do ... in order to do what we had been instructed to do so."
He goes on to say that much of his work was "in carrying out .. .instructions" (Frontline,
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2 0 0 3 ) . This shows that as an ambassador this is a strong emphasis of following instructions
and the standard operating procedures given by the State Department. Even when the
violence began, Ambassador Rawson suggested to the U.S. to keep some embassy staff in
Kigali to continue pushing for peace, although the final decision was to evacuate everyone.
When asked about this evacuation, Rawson again described the details of this
procedure. He explained that the convoy was made up of over 100 cars with 400 people, all
whom were directly or indirectly associated with the United States, and that he indeed did
leave in the last car, because, as he stated, 'That's what you do." This procedure is followed
so closely even when it is not practical. While Ambassador Rawson left in the last car, as
stated before in a ceremonious gesture, his car soon took its place in the middle of the
convoy so it could communicate with the front and the back as the cars drove out of
Rwanda (Rawson, 2 0 1 1) . This standard operating procedure is a prime example of simply
following the rules because that is what is expected, and afterward adj usting them for
safety and practicality purposes.
In another standard procedure of the State Department, this agency carefully chose
how to describe the events in Rwanda to a point of confusion. The State Department
spokesperson Christine Shelly refused to use the term "genocide." Instead she would only
refer to the events in Rwanda as "acts of genocide" and could not describe the difference
between the two terms (Power, 2 0 0 2 : 3 59).
The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose talks about the
argument over the term genocide. (Frontline, 2003). The State Department was caught up
in incredibly specific language that was both diplomatic and inoffensive, while arguably not
portraying the full extent of the genocide that was taking place in Rwanda. Even
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Ambassador Rawson was quoted as being hesitant to use the term "genocide" in the case
that the State Department was over-exaggerating the crisis before all the facts were
analyzed (Burkhalter, 1994: 50). Here the standard operating procedures of publicly using
the most precise and accurate terms overruled the importance of relaying the events that
were already commonly thought of as genocide.
The chain of command within the State Department must also be examined. If
Secretary of State Christopher, along with President Clinton, were never in favor of
intervention into Rwanda, any information coming from within the ranks would have still
been relatively ineffective. Moose says his department should have been more aggressive
in pushing their information up the hierarchical chain within the State Department. Moose
cannot recollect the content of his meetings with Christopher on the subject of Rwanda, but
recall s clearly that Rwanda was a subject at morning meetings with Deputy Secretary of
State Strobe Talbott. Yet even Moose recognizes that Talbott was not heavily engaged, but
hypothesizes that it was perhaps the lack of a true request to those in higher leadership
positions to examine the problem and help those who had been working continuously for a
solution (Frontline, 2 003). Moose's account shows that the Secretary of State was not
involved and that those below him were not invested, either.
In 1994 Madeleine Albright was the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and
therefore was aware of the United Nations' strategy to send a peacekeeping force to help
stop the violence in Rwanda. Before heading into a briefing on the genocide in Rwanda,
with the Rwandan Patriotic Front representative Claude Dusaidi, Albright received a memo
reminding her that she should be mostly in a "listening mode" and only give general
sympathy to Rwanda. She was not allowed to even hint that the U.S. would actively
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respond. Even though Albright met four times with Dusaidi, she acted on instructions given
from higher up within the bureaucracy (Power, 2 0 0 2 : 3 59) . Here we see Albright, the
ambassador who is working directly with Rwandan sources and UN peacekeeping
development following instructions and the agenda pre-set for her within the State
Department. U.S. foreign policy was not developed because of the information passed to
Albright within these meetings, but instead it was developed by her predetermined
responses.
H owever, a contrasting story is told in accounts of Albright's contribution to the U.S.
response to the genocide. In a Frontline interview, Albright attributes the failure of a U.S.
response to a lack of information about what was going on in Rwanda. She says it was not
"high on the agenda" because there were not frequent reports within the State Department,
she does admit to having instructions on how to vote within the United Nations considering
the peacekeeping forces. The three options were to support the peacekeeping efforts,
withdraw the troops completely, or to only have some reinforcement. Her instructions
were to support the withdrawal although she did not agree with them. During a meeting,
she chose not to call the State Department but instead to call the National Security Council,
headed by Tony Lake, the National Security advisor who was an expert on Africa (Frontline,
2 00 4).
Yet when the National Security Council heard that Albright already had instructions
on which option to support, they advised for her to follow them. It was not until later that
after she argued for new directions did she get them; she was allowed to support the option
of the middle option. Here is another example of how U.S. foreign policy is defined through
instructions that come from within the bureaucracy and not by the personal decisions of
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the chosen representatives. And j ust like Rawson, Albright describes a lack of influence
because "the system did not manage to push the information up high enough to people
making decisions" (Frontline, 2004) . The top decision-makers were not pushed to be
actively aware of the situation because of the power structure and the chain of command
within the State Department.
Application of Model III
Moving to Allison's third model of bureaucratic politics, much of the existing
literature explains individual roles within the State Department that helped form what
decision was made. We have already looked at Ambassador Rawson's role and his initial
decision to swiftly evacuate Americans from Rwanda. Looking at the State Department as a
whole will help discover how it works to influence U.S. foreign policy. First, Newt Gingrich
gives an account of the organizational processes within the State Department, arguing that
it suffers from an ineffective organizational structure (2 0 0 3 :43). He even goes on to
emphasize that the State Department lacks sound management, accountability, and a
strong leadership. The lack of these crucial elements can help to explain the lack of
influence the State Department had in creating an effective U.S. response to the Rwandan
Genocide.
The top-ranking official within the State Department at this time was Secretary of
State Warren Christopher. Christopher is described as completely loyal to President Clinton
and that he viewed his first job at making sure President Clinton did not act in a rash
manner (Schweid, 1994: 142). Like President Clinton, Christopher described the nature of
U.S. foreign policy as focusing on shaping a world that will be in accordance with U.S.
interests and values, making it a safer and more secure place that will provide the U.S. with
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open economic opportunities (1995: 6). In 1995 he reported on such opportunities and the
direction of U.S. foreign policy. He only mentioned Rwanda once in the context of the U.S.
helping to establish a war crimes tribunal there, and assuring that our diplomatic efforts
would strive toward a peace and reconciliation process (1995: 1 5). Christopher seemed to
share the exact views with the President on not risking involvement in any conflicts where
U.S. interests could not be benefited.
Another maj or player within the State Department was Joyce Leader, as mentioned
above, who was the Deputy Chief of Mission in Rwanda. Even though she knew at 8 a.m. the
morning after the president's plane was shot down that the Hutu were systematically
killing Tutsi, when she returned to the U.S. she was rarely consulted. In fact she was
instructed not to deal directly with her sources in Kigali (Power, 2 0 0 2 : 3 65) . Power tries to
explain this counter-intuitive treatment of Leader. She states that within the State
Department, African specialists such as Leader had the least political clout of all the
regional specialists. People such as Leader, due to the internal politics and culture of the
State Department, had the least chance of affecting the outcome of U.S. foreign policy.
Allison's third model of analyzing the internal politics of a specific organization is shown
through the actions and limitations of multiple players within the State Department who
dealt with Rwanda.
Analyzing the new role of Ambassador Rawson after evacuating Rwanda, we can
clearly see the internal differences within the State Department. Rawson describes his
work as being "actively engaged." At his level there was teleconferencing, memos on new
strategies for troop deployment, and keeping informed of the on-th e-ground situation.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Prudence Bushnell was in contact
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with the cabinet director of Rwanda's Ministry of Defense Colonel Theoneste Bagosora who
is believed to have been the coordinator for the genocide. In his official cables to Bagosora,
Bushnell is clearly demanding a stop to the killings and urging, again, peace talks. Yet even
though Rawson and his colleagues were working on forming a U.S. response to the
situation in Rwanda, he states that "the problem [was] that we weren't.. .able to move the
bureaucracy" (Frontline, 2003). This proves to be true in the fact that Bushnell sent
updates on Rwanda to the Secretary of State each day, yet it can be assumed that these
updates did not influence the highest position in the State Department. Yet when asked
about this inability to "move the bureaucracy," Rawson explains that is essentially
bureaucratic conflicts that hinder the decision-making process (Rawson, 2 0 1 1) .
These internal conflicts occur over which tactics o r strategies t o use, and argues that
the only way to overcome this inevitable struggle is by an intervention of the president.
Rawson states that if the President were to have ordered the State Department to resolve a
solution as quickly as possible, the tedious bureaucratic procedures and disagreements
could have been easily avoided such as the long loan procurements or arguments over
army personnel carriers. Burkhalter gives a lengthier account of such banters, saying that
the Pentagon and the U.N. negotiated for weeks over such details as the type of wheels that
should be on tanks. Yet it was not only the internal procedures of the State Department but
also those of the United Nations that very much slowed down the development of a
solution to the violence in Rwanda (Rawson, 2 0 1 1) . The Department of Defense also
recognized the "excruciating pace" of the negotiations (Burkhalter, 1994: 51 ). Even George
M oose, the S ecretary of African Affairs, describes the workings of the State Department at
this time as "Bureaucracy at its worst" (Rawson, 2 0 1 1) .
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Daniel Drezner takes Allison's model of bureaucratic politics and instead of applying
it to individual actors within one bureaucracy; he views each bureaucracy as having a
specific agenda, competing with other agencies. The bureaucracies become Allison's
individual players. The outcome of the competition among the different agencies is foreign
policy. If we look at the State Department's role through the Drezner's lens, we can clearly
see that the State D epartment has a unique culture that is bred within its own institution.
Drezner's findings suggest that the existence of a strong organizational culture, such as the
State Department's, can hinder the implementation of their ideas within foreign policy.
( 2 0 0 0 : 7 3 5) . Drezner offers a slightly different perspective of testing Allison's third model,
one that can still explain the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of the State Department due to
its unique culture of procedures.
Conclusion
Allison's three models accurately give a comprehensive understanding of how the
U.S. foreign policy was formed in response to the Rwandan genocide during 1994. While
the President is the final decision-maker, on-the-ground information comes through our
U.S. ambassadors in their foreign posts, which all follow a set of standard operating
procedures. Part of their role is to advise U.S. foreign policy and work within the State
Department who sends information up the chain, eventually to the President and his
advisors. Therefore it is important to consider these other factors when looking at the
Clinton administration's decision of non-action in the face of the fastest genocide of our
time. Allison provides the methodology to analyze these other factors and help to explain
why inaction was seen as the most rational choice during the events.
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Using M odel I helps sort through the President's personal attitude toward U.S.
foreign policy and what lessons Clinton was trying to learn from, such as the failed
humanitarian interventions in Somalia and Bosnia. Model II focuses on the role of
Ambassador Rawson and how the carrying-out of set instructions shapes U.S. foreign
policy. M odel I I I examines the internal actors within the State Department and who held
the power to either respond to the Rwandan information or to ignore it, and how this
information becomes lost within bureaucratic politics. Together these three levels of
analysis create an overall picture of the multitude of actors involved within the formation
of U.S. foreign policy, from those with power to those unable to push the agenda they
thought most important. It is not just enough to use President Clinton's personal attitudes
as a justification for the U.S. response, but to look at who were the channels of information
and where the power rested within the bureaucracies. This is where Allison's own work
becomes most beneficial and can be accurately applied to the 1994 genocide.
Some limitations to this research do exist. While this specific study benefited from a
telephone interview with former Ambassador Rawson it was not possible to interview all
other major actors involved during the Rwandan genocide, even though many recorded
public interviews were used for data. The information for each model was not equal; much
less information was found on President Clinton's personal actions during the genocide.
The accounts of his attitudes and approaches toward U.S. foreign policy are through those
who worked with him. Much more information exists on how President Clinton regretted
not acting in Rwanda after the fact, and the development work his foundation is doing
today. M odels I I and III were much more heavily analyzed as much more information and
interviews existed.
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The use of Allison's three models must rely heavily on qualitative case studies. In
case studies it will always be difficult to include every actor involved or to scientifically
approach individuals' personality traits and outside factors that may have influenced their
decisions or actions. Yet this three-model approach serves to look beyond the narrow
approach of examining only the president's decisions and reaches to further understand
the dynamics of other leaders and the structure of the bureaucracy involved in the
decision-making. This research serves as an example of how Allison can be applied and
accurately account for the decisions of multiple actors within the formation of U.S. foreign
policy. Allison's method can continue to be applied to other maj or events in U.S. foreign
policy and how the government molds a response.
In regards to Rwanda, it is important to realize that the United States eventually did
recognize that the situation in Rwanda was much more severe than the top decision
makers first realized and that a response was needed. The response came after most of the
killing was done and involved significant humanitarian relief, of which Ambassador
Rawson became a part (Rawson, 2 0 1 1). In later years Madeleine Albright, as Secretary of
State in 1997, was the first one from the U.S. government to formally admit that the
international community should have taken a more active response to the genocide in
Rwanda and acknowledged earlier that the violence was, indeed, genocide (Lippman, 2000:
1 1 5). Burkhalter divides the genocide into five different phases, recognizing that in the fifth
phase - the mass immigration of Rwandan refuges - the United States finally responded
with humanitarian assistance, visits to the refugee camps. Rwanda became a top priority
within the State Department, the Pentagon, and within the Clinton administration to form a
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creative and effective response to the existing problems in the aftermath of the killings
(Burkhalter, 1994: 44 )

.
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Chapter 3 : The Role of the Diplomat and How Development is Changing Traditional
Diplomacy Practices

Introduction
United States ambassadors serve as the face of U.S. foreign policy abroad,
representing the President and the American public. Being an ambassador is a very
distinguished and honored position, one that has a historical tradition of respect and
formality. Ambassadors used to be the only communication between a foreign government
and the United States, but in today's world with increased technologies, complex global
markets, and altogether more and faster routes of communication, their traditional role is
fading. Yet most scholars, as previously stated, agree that diplomats are still an integral
part, arguably the center, of U.S. relations. However, most of these scholars also agree that
the role of our U.S. diplomats is not completely understood. This chapter will focus on
understanding the role of our U.S. ambassadors through personal interviews with eight
former ambassadors.34 These ambassadors were chosen based on the economic status of
the country in which they served and their availability.5 No ambassadors from countries
that are considered to have a very high human development index participated in an
interview.

3

The ambassadors chosen for interview were as follows, along with their time of service and host countries:
1. Hugh D ouglas Barclay, E l Salvador 2 0 0 3- 2 0 0 7 2. George Bruno, Belize 1994- 1 9 9 7 3 . Phillip Hughes,
Barbados and Eastern Caribbean, 1990-1993 4. john Maisto, Venezuela 1 9 9 7-2000, N icaragua 1993- 1996 5.
Thomas Melady, Burundi 1 969- 1972, Uganda 1 9 7 2 - 1 9 7 3 6. David Miller, Tanzania 1 9 8 1 - 1 984, Zimbabwe
1 9 84- 1 9 8 6 7. Pete Peterson, Vietnam 1997-2001 8. David Rawson, Rwanda 1993- 1996.
4 This research protocol was approved by the Eastern I llinois University I nstitutional Review Board on
N ovember 1 8, 2 0 1 1. File Number: 1 1 - 1 5 6.
5 The countries from which the former ambassadors served are largely considered developing by the United
Nations standards. The UN list of Least-Developed Countries can be found at
http: //www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/2 5/. Uganda, Tanzania, and Burundi are on this list. Rwanda and Zimbabwe
are considered to have low human development, El Salvador, Vietnam, and Nicaragua are considered to have
medium human development, and Belize and Venezuela are considered to have high human development.
The data is given here: http: //hdr.undp.org/en/data/profiles/.
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My interviews with the former ambassadors will seek to uncover how each
individual defined their role and function in representing the United States. Responses
included how the ambassadors carried out their day-to-day tasks, what they viewed as
their most significant accomplishments, and how they integrated international
development initiatives into their work within the host country.6 My hypothesis is that the
traditional work of diplomats in making peace treaties and ongoing negotiations is now
changing to include more social and economic development initiatives. It is no longer
formal treaties that keep the United States and other countries at peace, but instead it is in
using our extensive resources for developing other countries that will keep relations
steady.
How Former Ambassadors Define Their Role
The first step to understanding a diplomat's role is how they themselves define their
own function. Ambassador John Maisto, who served as the U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua
from 1 9 9 3 to 1 9 9 6 and then as the U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela from 1997 to 2 0 00,
perhaps stated his role most bluntly: the ambassador is the special representative of the
U.S. president.7 He reiterated common U.S. governmental responsibilities: the President,
along with the Executive Branch, is responsible for carrying out foreign relations under the
Constitution. The State Department and all of the U.S. ambassadors are a part of the
Executive Branch. The ambassadors have the responsibility of carrying-out the foreign
policy that is decided upon by the U.S. President and Congress, within their host country.
The ambassador is used to engage directly with the members of a foreign government and

6
7

The interview questions asked to each ambassador can be found in Appendix A.
Ambassador John Maisto also served as the U.S. Ambassador to the Organization o f American States.
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that foreign country's own citizens to gain the best possible relationship possible between
the two governments (Maisto, 20 1 2 ) .
Ambassador George Bruno, who served a s the U . S . Ambassador t o Belize from 19941 9 9 7, stated that the purpose of having an embassy in another country is to, in a broad
sense, represent U.S. interests in all aspects of bilateral interests between the United States
and the host country. The primary importance of this representation is that the
ambassador always conducts himself or herself in a respectful manner to the host country
and its citizens (Bruno, 20 1 2 ) . Ambassador David Miller, who served as the U.S.
Ambassador to Tanzania from 1981 -1 984 and then to Zimbabwe from 1984 to 1986,
believed every ambassador should always be aware of his or her actions.8 Being late, even
by a few minutes, could signal to the host country that the United States is unhappy with
something. Casual tardiness could not be acceptable because it could actually damage
relations between the U.S. and the host country (Miller, 2 0 1 2 ) . The ambassador must be
acutely aware of every action and statement because they are seen as the first
representative of the United States. Most of the former ambassadors interviewed
mentioned the need to follow "protocol."
While real orders and directions were never specified, "protocol" seems to be a
word that covers the respect and heightened formal manners that Bruno and Miller
mentioned. Ambassador Philip Hughes, who served as the U.S. Ambassador to Barbados
and the Eastern Caribbean from 1990 to 1993, stated that there is no list of all the standard
protocols that all ambassadors are expected to be polite and use the correct titles when

Ambassador David Miller also served as the U.S. Ambassador to the National Security Council from 1 989 to
1991.

8
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addressing others (Hughes, 2 0 1 2) .9 Ambassador Pete Peterson, who served as the U.S.
Ambassador to Vietnam from 1997 to 2 0 0 1, was also in agreement, stating that it is
important for a U.S. ambassador to follow protocols of who should be invited to which
functions, how people stand, and where people are seated (Peterson, 20 12).
However, the State Department does have a curriculum for training new
ambassadors, yet H ughes did not believe even this training offered any specific protocols to
follow. Hughes suggested that one of the primary responsibilities of a U.S. ambassador is to
always be available. He j oked that the main mission of an ambassador is to not be in the
bathroom when the U.S. president calls, but, in more seriousness, the ambassador should
never put anyone important on hold, specifically high-ranking officials from the U.S. and
from their host country. Again this worry over manners and availability shows h ow an
ambassador is expected to uphold very rigorous manners and respectful ways of acting and
interacting with members of the host country. Ambassador Peterson responded that all
ambassadors must be certain that they treat the host country with an element of respect
for that country's sovereignty and with honor for their leadership. All ambassadors should
act in a way that complies with international norms (Peterson, 2 0 1 2 ) .
Ambassador Thomas Melady, the U.S. Ambassador t o Burundi from 1 9 69 t o 1972
and then to Uganda from 1972-1 973, said that one of the primary U.S. interests he
represented to Burundi and Uganda was a general interest and concern for the safety of
American citizens within his host countries.10 It was important to make sure the host
country's government understood that the safety of U.S. citizens was an important concern

9

The Eastern Caribbean i s the general term that refers to the countries: Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia, St.
Vincent, and the Grenadines.
1 0 Ambassador Melady also served as the U.S. Ambassador to the Holy See from 1989 to 1993.
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of the United States. During his time, most of the American citizens located in Burundi and
Uganda were affiliated either directly or indirectly with mission organizations. He kept in
steady communications with these citizens in case a safety concern were to occur (Melady,
2012).
M ost of the ambassadors, when asked if there was ever a crisis situation they
needed to respond to, often noted the protocols for evacuating the embassy staff and
notifying the American citizens if the crisis was a large, national concern. Ambassador
M elady described a crisis in Uganda where there was an attempted coup d'etat in May of
1 9 7 2 . While the coup was unsuccessful there was a very brutal situation that lasted three
to four weeks, and Melady said that the primary concern for the U.S. embassy and all other
embassies located in Uganda was for their own citizens (Melady, 2 0 1 2 ) . Ambassador Bruno
had to deal with crises in Belize relating to severe weather. For example, if a hurricane
were approaching, usually in the summer or the fall, he would follow protocol by alerting
the U.S. citizens who were in Belize and evacuate the U.S. embassy (Bruno, 2 0 1 2 ) .
In the previous chapter, which examined the role o f Ambassador David Rawson
who served in Rwanda in 1994, there was a large emphasis put on the role of protecting
American citizens because the genocide in Rwanda was such an extreme case. Many
Americans were specifically targeted and unfortunately some of the U.S. embassy's staff
lost their lives. Yet even when no extreme emergency or crisis is expected, the safety of
American citizens, according to many of the former ambassadors interviewed, remains a
high priority for ambassadors. Ambassador Barclay mentioned the priority of American
safety in his host country was especially high due to the constant general violence
throughout El Salvador (Barclay, 2 0 1 1).
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To Ambassador Maisto, the protection and safety of U.S. citizens was the number
one priority and responsibility as ambassador. This responsibility overrode everything
else. The ambassador and the in-country embassy must look out for the well being of any
American citizen. If a situation occurs where an American citizen is put in jail in a foreign
country, the U.S. consulate and the Consul General, along with his staff, have the task of
visiting the American in jail, ensuring they have access to legal counsel, and attest that they
are not being discriminated against. The first priority is to legally get them out of jail and
back into the U nited States. Maisto also dealt with Americans who needed financial
assistance and would help them contact a family member or friend from the U.S. who could
provide such assistance. Maisto said that it is up to the ambassador to make sure American
citizens within the host country know that the U.S. embassy is there for any needed
assistance and protection (Maisto, 20 12). The examples Maisto gave show how his focus as
Ambassador was very nationalistic.
While acting in a respectful manner and keeping American citizens safe were both
commonly cited as the main role of a U.S. ambassador, many other answers were also
given. For example, Ambassador Peterson argued that keeping constant and transparent
communication with the U.S. government is also an important function of the ambassador
(Peterson, 2 0 1 2 ) . Peterson believed that it was important to always report on what he was
doing and the general activities of his embassy to his superiors in Washington, D.C. The
uninterrupted communication was to prevent any surprises or discrepancies between
what the U.S. government expected Ambassador Peterson to do and what he was actually
doing. H ere Ambassador Peterson found his role to be a steady liaison between the U.S. and
his host country.

47

Daily Tasks and Functions of Ambassadors
Now that we have a foundational understanding of how some ambassadors view
their work and the most important roles they carry out as the central U.S. representative, it
is important to next understand how they carry out these roles. Based on the my previous
research and the research examined in the literature review, we would anticipate that the
ambassador spend much of his time gathering communications and serving as a liaison
between his or her host country and the United States. Ambassador Miller and Ambassador
Hughes both described their first daily task as reading any cables that had come through to
the embassy during the night that needed their attention. According to Hughes these cables
could be urgent instructions from the State Department on things to do politically, specific
U.S. views to represent to the host government, messages to be delivered, administrative
functions, or even personnel memos. After reading through the daily cables, Ambassador
Hugh es would call a meeting with his embassy staff to delegate tasks to the respective
positions, such as the political-economic officer, the economic officer, the labor attache, and
so on (Hughes, 2 0 1 2 ) . Ambassador Miller would most often be engaged in meetings after
trying to anticipate any new situations within Tanzania or Zimbabwe (Miller, 2 0 1 2) .
Ambassador Bruno shared a similar daily schedule during h i s time a s ambassador.
He first answered the question by responding, "Typically there is no typical day." He then
gave some example of what his day might have included, such as dealing with a vote at the
United Nations by the host country, welcoming a military commander or a U.S. naval ship
that was pulling into a port to conduct training exercises with the Belizean military.
Perhaps he would host discussions with a visiting U.S. trade delegation or have a meeting
with the host country's drug enforcement. He would often meet with his own embassy staff
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to discuss initiatives to combat the flow of narcotics through Central America and meet
with the Prime Minister of Belize (Bruno, 2 0 1 2 ) .
Ambassador Hughes would have similar tasks throughout a n ordinary day as
ambassador to Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean. He gave examples of planning trips
with his political officers to different island nations. He would try to plan one trip each
month with one main task to carry out. One month it would be for counter-narcotics,
another for aid, another for security cooperation or military assistance, or perhaps for
humanitarian relief. Hughes gave a strong example of meeting with the British and
Canadian High Commissioners, the other two largest providers of assistance to the host
countries, and discussed any shared concerns the three donor countries had. They would
try to strengthen cooperation between the United States, Great Britain, and Canada by
sharing goals and any areas they needed help with (Hughes, 2 0 1 2 ) .
Many ambassadors reflected o n their time spent hosting receptions and social
parties for different government organizations and leaders. Looking again at Ambassador
Hughes, he gave examples of hosting visiting delegations from the U.S. such as the
American Business Club or the Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Command. The
ambassador and his staff would organize a reception or a dinner party and invite leaders
from within the Barbados and surrounding nations' governments. He said there was hardly
a night when he was able to just go home after work, but always had to attend some
gathering or cultural event to show that U.S. support and interest. Ambassador Miller
suspected that at least three nights a week he and his wife were out at some sort of event
or they themselves were entertaining, making his schedule active long after normal
workday hours (2 0 1 2) .
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Ambassador Maisto also recalled having social events almost every night, Monday
through Fridays, and on special occasions even on the weekends. Sometimes these events
would only call for a quick drop-in by the ambassador, perhaps for a photo opportunity.
For some events, the ambassador would appoint another member of his staff to attend as
his representative. Whatever the event, it was important to attend or to have a U.S.
presence to show to the host country that the United States was active and interested.
Maisto also gave examples of hosting visitors from the United States. If there were a
Congressional congregation, he would try to host them in his own home. It seemed to be
equally important for the ambassador to engage with leaders and community members of
the host country and of the United States. It was, in general, important to put the visitors
from the United States into contact with people from the host country, and this was done
through social events and interactions (Maisto, 2 0 1 2 ) .
Besides constant meetings, discussions, and events, ambassadors must actually run
their embassy. Ambassador Hughes said that it was his experience that the State
Department preferred the ambassador to deal with "higher-level" activities than managing
the embassy, especially if the ambassador was politically appointed, and instead have
someone in a lower position to take on this role. However, Ambassador Hughes took an
unusually active role in managing his embassy, especially during a budget crisis in which
his embassy had to radically cut spending and become more efficient. It was his experience
that many people took advantage of diplomatic privileges by abusing the right to bring
goods into the country, and some people were using this duty-free privilege to stock a store
they were operating in the United States. Because Ambassador Hughes took his
representation of the United States very seriously, he took it upon himself to uphold the
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U.S. reputation and pay closer attention to his own personnel to help combat some of the
corruption and other abuses that were suspected (Hughes, 2 0 1 2 ) . In order to better
represent the United States as ambassador, Hughes carried out the role of a manager in a
larger way than what is typical of an ambassador.
Defining Ambassadors By Significant Tasks Accomplished
While understanding the general tasks that ambassadors carry out each day as our
U.S. representative abroad, their true role can be synonymous with their most significant
tasks that were achieved outside of their daily meetings and events. Each former
ambassador was asked to comment on their most significant task that they accomplished
during their time of service.
Ambassador Miller served in Tanzania from 1981-1 984 and commented that his
most significant task was helping to negotiate peace and prevent a civil war in South Africa.
He used his influence in Tanzania to pressure the Tanzanian government to remove their
troops from Angola and Mozambique, which was a very important step to the South African
government. South Africa lived in fear of Communism and so Ambassador Miller helped
alleviate any threats by pressuring the Cuban troops to withdraw from the region.
Ambassador Miller also worked hard to have South Africa release Mr. Nelson Mandela,
which he considers to be the most significant result of his work as ambassador. Miller is a
great example of the traditional diplomatic role, negotiating between multiple countries,
using a complex political strategy with multiple players to achieve a goal. He recognized
that he served a long time ago, reminding that his region of command in Africa was under
Eisenhower (Miller, 2 0 1 2) .
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Ambassador Barclay cited his most significant accomplishment as improving the
economic and social initiatives within his host country. His main goal was to improve the
overall Gross Domestic Product of El Salvador, recognizing the importance of economic
development. He saw a strong connection between the economic security of El Salvador
and trade relations and security between El Salvador and the United States. Violence within
El Salvador was a central problem; one that Barclay believed could be solved with better
economic opportunities for those creating the violence (Barclay, 2 0 1 1) . The violence
during this time was hurting the tourism industry and other business opportunities that
would help raise El Salvador's Gross Domestic Product, as Barclay hoped. Barclay
successfully won a grant from the Millennium Challenge Corporation for $46 1 to promote
economic development within the north of El Salvador (Danilovich : 2 0 06). His work with
development was seen as so significant that he was awarded "Noble Friend of El Salvador,"
the highest honor that can be given by this country to a non-citizen. When the President of
El Salvador recognized Barclay with this award, he did so by commending his efforts in
economic and social development (Press Release: 2 006) .
Barclay served from 2003-2 007, about twenty years after Ambassador Miller served
in Tanzania. While this was only one comparison between two former U.S. ambassadors, it
is clear how different each ambassador's significant roles were where Barclay's was
focused on economic development in contrast to the negotiations and political tactics
Miller accomplished.
Ambassador Pete Peterson served as ambassador to Vietnam from 1997-2001 as
the first U.S. ambassador to Vietnam since the Vietnam War. His main focus was on
establishing strong diplomatic relations between the United States and Vietnam. He says he
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was able to accomplish this with many different methods, but above all he recognized the
need of establishing a strong economic relationship. If the United States had a strong
economic relationship with Vietnam, then a strong diplomatic relationship would also
ensue, in which human rights and other U.S. interests could be agreed upon. Peterson
credits his success in creating a strong relationship with Vietnam by focusing on economic
issues, or development. He helped begin Vietnam entry into negotiations with the World
Trade Organization that would help with environmental, transportation, and financial
issues. He also worked extensively in developing the human rights advancement of
Vietnam, particularly with recognizing different religions.
As a result of Peterson's work, Vietnam recognizes the authority of virtually every
religion in the world, which was not true when he arrived in 1997. These large steps in
economic and social initiatives allowed Vietnam to become a stronger regional player
within Asia and helped them to become a contemporary member of the United Nations
Security Council (Peterson, 2 0 1 2 ) . Peterson is another example of how development, both
economic and social, plays a crucial role within U.S. diplomacy and how development was
the focal point of U.S. relations with another country.
Ambassador Maisto recalled his most significant tasks in Nicaragua as being a
strong ally of Nicaragua's newly democratically elected government. He was proud of the
work he did with the U.S. economic assistance program in which he oversaw nine hundred
million dollars of aid to, at that time during the mid 1990s, the second poorest country in
the Western H emisphere. During his time in Venezuela, Maisto was proud of his negotiated
tax treaty, which has become one of the model tax treaties in the world. As in Nicaragua,
Maisto was proud of his work done with the government in Venezuela. He spent a
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significant amount of time with the new government, specifically with Hugo Chavez,
explaining U.S. policy and representing the United States as a willing partner and ally
(Maisto, 2 0 1 2 ) .
Development Becoming New Focus of Diplomacy
From almost every response of these former ambassadors, working with economic
and social development initiatives within their host country was a central focus of their
work, so much so that their most significant tasks were centered around their
accomplishments within development. Only one ambassador did not have an economic
initiative cited as his most significant accomplishment, and he served the earliest out of
those ambassadors interviewed, suggesting that development has more recently become
increasingly important. In this section the research will continue to look at the responses
from the personal interviews with the selected former U.S. ambassadors to better
understand if and how development was a common aspect of their daily work Based on
the previous research, we would anticipate that economic and social development of the
host country is indeed becoming a stronger focus for U.S. ambassadors.
Ambassador Melady, who served in Burundi, said he spent a great part of his time
working with development organizations within his host country. He understood before he
arrived that much of his focus as ambassador would need to be on development because of
his particular country. He knew a big problem in Burundi was what he calls the "unholy
trinity" of poverty, illiteracy, and disease, and the only way to help ease these problems
would be to work with the local Burundi government to enthusiastically and forcefully face
these three main challenges. He cited working extensively with the United Nations and
other international organizations that were helping advance economic initiatives within

54

Burundi. One of these organizations was the World Health Organization who was there
during his time to help combat a whooping cough epidemic. Melady said that it was U.S.
policy for him to help with and to make any suggestions to things regarding economic
development. Melady said the economic development of Burundi was his first concern as
ambassador (Melady, 2 0 12).
Ambassador Hugh es also said that over fifty percent of his personnel were involved
in working with development. He worked regularly with the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) and tried to keep involved with their programs and
serve as an advocate for the different proj ects they were working on. He noted that it was
not within his role as U.S. ambassador to shape USAID's policy, but it was his j ob to monitor
their progress and to stay knowledgeable about their programs. Ambassador Bruno also
had a similar experience in working with USAI D. Yet during his time there were individuals
from the U.S. who worked with non-governmental organizations doing different
development proj ects such as providing medical care, teaching children, or even excavating
Mayan ruins for cultural purposes (Bruno, 2 0 1 2 ) .
Ambassador M iller recalled that h e also worked a lot with development
organizations in both Tanzania and Zimbabwe. During his time, the United States was the
largest donor of aid to Zimbabwe, meaning it was a large part of Miller's role to work with
development, particularly with activities provided by non-governmental organizations. In
Tanzania Miller was heavily involved with the Peace Corps mission. He commented that his
wife, especially, took a very active role in advocating for development. Miller and his wife
toured the countryside and noted that one of the most efficient economic proj ects going on
at the time was a women's cooperative. Mrs. Miller become involved in financing these
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women through small $500 grants so women could organize themselves for efficient
purchasing and other financial activities to better their economic situations. Miller
confirmed that indeed he spent a lot of his time on development issues in both of his host
countries, as did his wife (Miller, 2 0 1 2 ) .
F o r Ambassador Peterson, who had to begin diplomatic relations between the
United States and Vietnam, there was no USAID mission or any other large governmental
organization in place for promoting economic development. To begin with, Peterson said
he worked closely with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other
financial organizations. He also worked with the United Nations on refugee issues and
disaster preparedness. He had to work to convince USAID to come into the country and
they were slower than what Hughes had anticipated, but he was proud to say that USAID
now has a very large presence in Vietnam with many different development programs
being carried out. Peterson, when commenting on the amount of time he spent working
with various development organizations, said that working on development issues is
something "ambassadors do without even thinking, it is so common" (2 0 1 2 ) .
Ambassador Barclay and his work with development issues i n El Salvador were
already mentioned in the previous section. He continued to explain his development work
by partnering extensively with the U.S. military. Oftentimes he would have the military
come to E l Salvador for military training exercises, and afterwards they would do
development work. One example he gave was how the U.S. military built a temporary
hospital in a rural area of El Salvador, and after administering aid and medical attention to
the surrounding area, they would move the hospital to another region and repeat the
medical work. Barclay believed the military did a lot of good work with their economic and
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s ocial development proj ects, especially regarding this example of a hospital, and he would
often times partner with the military to carry-out similar initiatives (Barclay, 2 0 1 2 ) .
Barclay gave o n e brief example o f how the military has carried out projects t o enhance the
economic and social conditions in foreign countries. Chapter four will explore the role of
the U.S. military in more depth, regarding how the military fits into diplomatic affairs and
performing international development work.
It is quite clear that these ambassadors spent a great deal of time meeting with
development and aid organizations, keeping up-to-date on different projects, suggesting
and advocating for ideas, and overall taking an active role in the economic and social
improvement of their host countries. In the previous section many of the ambassadors'
most significant accomplishments were centered on development achievements, and this
section portrayed a general idea of just how involved with development work the
ambassadors were. Development was a central concern of the U.S. ambassadors and
therefore a large component of the function of ambassadors and a core piece of U.S.
diplomacy.
Conclusion
While ambassadors inarguably serve as the foremost representative of the United
States and its interests abroad, there existed a gap in understanding. Sharp advocates for a
better understanding of how diplomacy fits within international relations, and this chapter
used interviews and case studies of individual former U.S. ambassadors to better
understand the role of ambassadors within U.S. diplomacy (1999:39). Sharp also admits
that diplomacy is in decline, yet even this decline is poorly understood. This chapter found
that diplomacy in a traditional sense is indeed declining. Traditional negotiating has been
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replaced by a strong emphasis on development as it relates to U.S. security. According to
the former ambassadors interviewed, their significant tasks included achieved
development goals and improved economic standards for their host country. In order to
achieve such initiatives, Clinton argues that diplomacy and the tactics that are still revered
within diplomacy, such as negotiating, are crucial ( 2 0 1 0 : 1 5) .
These interviews provide direct support for Clinton's argument i n her review. For
example, Clinton recognizes that the material conditions, or the economic situations, of
people directly affect U.S. national security policies. If development objectives are properly
reached, then development can be one of the best tools to forward U.S. stability within our
world. Because of this, U.S. ambassadors and others within the State Department must be
better trained to work on issues of economic and social development (Clinton, 2 0 1 0 : 18) .
Development i s one o f the most effective aspects that a U.S. ambassador can work with
while representing the United States and promoting our interests abroad.
From the p ersonal interviews of former U.S. ambassadors, the daily tasks, long-term
goals, and overall trends of U.S. diplomatic efforts can be better understood. Each
ambassador interviewed had a very specific view of their role and how to define it. Their
daily routines of meetings and work with development organizations described how they
carried out their own defined functions. The significant tasks accomplished showed an
emphasis on economic and social development work as opposed to negotiations and peace
treaties of traditional diplomacy. This emphasis on international development is mirrored
and reaffirmed in Secretary of State Clinton's report on the State Department and the
strategies that need to be assumed to forward U.S. relations by combining development
with diplomacy.
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With a greater understanding of the daily tasks these lower-profile ambassadors
performed each day as U.S. ambassadors, we can begin to answer the questions many
previous scholars have asked. Some scholars argued that diplomacy is irrelevant and the
role of the diplomat is only preserved for tradition (Sharp, 1999; Cooper, 1999: 20, 17 4;
Stearns, 1 9 7 3 : 1 6 3 ) . The evidence from the personal interviews show that U.S.
ambassadors see themselves as the direct representation of the United States and actively
give support to the host countries. They are the link between on-the-ground situations and
U.S. policy makers in Washington, D.C. Their link is important because they are kept up to
speed on every piece of news and current affairs, each day, within their country.
Ambassador Maisto put it best that he needed to know everything that was happening,
regardless of its importance, because the most important thing was that ne never be
surprised by something, so that the leaders in the U.S. will never be surprised (Maisto,
2012).
T h e ambassador serves a s the formal link i n communications. Even though
technology enables news to be spread faster and easier around the world, an ambassador
lives within the country, has a broad knowledge of the political climate, understands the
role of each actor within the U.S. embassy, the host country's government, and even things
such as opposition movements. Therefore the ambassador serves to put the current affairs
in their host government into a larger context that is not always captured by the media.
Therefore the ambassador still plays a critical role as an in-country source of information
and conceptual "glue" that puts together every small piece of information into a larger
frame of reference between the host country and the United States. The evidence here is in
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line with both Cooper and Sharp. Cooper believed that the "classic functions" of
ambassadors, specifically representation, will continue to stay important (1999 : 2 1).
This research showed a strong focus on protocol, or the standard operating
procedures that all ambassadors are expected to follow and how information and decision
making is processed and decided upon throughout the State Department bureaucracy.
These protocols reinforce Allison's ideas from his three-model process. Ambassadors are a
key element in the making of U.S. foreign policy. While they do not necessarily have the
power to individually shift the U.S. agenda towards their host country, there are specific
steps they take to suggest their ideas to the correct people within the State Department and
the chain of command is strictly followed. Many of these ambassadors gave examples of
crisis situations in which they follow procedures to first protect the lives of U.S. citizens.
The responses by these ambassadors mirror the importance of standard operating
procedures that Ambassador Rawson showed in the last chapter. Ambassadors are
relevant to U.S. diplomacy by uniformly responding to situations and following certain
protocol that begins the process of forming U.S. foreign policy. In affect, ambassadors are
the first responders to any situation between the United States and the host country.
Yet the evidence also shows that the substance of an ambassador's agenda is
shifting. Clinton has already pushed for a stronger emphasis on international development,
and the ambassadors interviewed cited many examples of working with development
organizations and setting goals for their host country's economic and social improvement.
Here is where ambassadors need to adapt to stay relevant. The State Department does not
have the resources necessary to carry out all of the proj ects and initiatives that are
important for maintaining stable relations between foreign countries and the United States.
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I nstead, the U.S. military holds these resources that can provide substantial
development proj ects. The role of the military is becoming larger within the diplomatic
sphere of international relations, threatening the relevance of the ambassador figure in
carrying out U.S. foreign policy, especially in regards to economic and social initiatives.
While this chapter did not examine this aspect of the Ambassadorial experience, but the
following chapter will do so.
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Chapter 4: The New Diplomatic Role of the United States Military

Introduction
The practice of United States diplomacy, while internally changing, is also being
affected by outside factors such as the mass media and technological innovations. Yet
perhaps the strongest outside factor is the role of the U.S. military in foreign policy. It is
common today to hear examples of military "nation-building" proj ects such as
administering food, medicine, building schools, and training foreign police forces
throughout the world. The military seems to have an increasing role in the formal relations
between the United States and the world, a role that has been traditionally carried out by
ambassadors. Dana Priest examines this current phenomenon and focuses special attention
on the role of the military's Commander-in-Chiefs, now known as the Unified Combatant
Commanders. The U.S. military has divided the world into regions of command, one of
which is the Central Command. Priest analyzes the Unified Combatant Commander of
Central Command, General Anthony Zinni, who began his position in 1998.11 H e
commanded the region most widely accepted a s the Middle East, which included parts o f
West Africa a n d Central Asia. For this study h i s position will b e referred t o the current title,
that is, UCC. Zinni's legacy from 1998 through 2 0 0 1 was full of very diplomatic-flavored
proj ects and with his relations with other heads of state, who expected him to help solve
problems that would generally be sought from an ambassador (Priest, 2004: 94) .
Priest gives specific examples o f such diplomatic relations General Zinni held within
his region of control. The General would go falcon hunting with Saudi Arabia's royal family,

11

The countries within General Anthony Zinni's region of control were: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran,
Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.
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be invited to traditional tribal dances in Kenya, and led humanitarian relief and aid efforts
in M ogadishu (Priest, 2004: 70). Many leaders would ask him to help s olve their problems
of civil wars, terrorism, and even large-scale starvation (Priest, 2004: 68). All of these
things are not what a four-star military general traditionally does, but instead what a
traditional United States ambassador would be expected to include in trying to further
benefit relations between their host country and the United States. As Priest's prime
example, General Zinni embodies the general direction the military has recently been
taking. Priest portrays Zinni as a strong example as a military general that assumes a
greater role in development, personal relationships with foreign leaders, and other
diplomatic duties. Building upon Priest's research, this chapter will use the evidence from
an interview conducted with General Zinni to further examine the military's new role
within diplomacy.
My interview with Zinni will test multiple hypotheses, all of which come mostly
from Priest's review of General Zinni in The Mission along with the data gathered from my
interviews with former U.S. Ambassadors noted in the previous chapters. 1213The first
hypothesis is that the military has many more available resources, especially budgetary,
than does the State Department. The second is that the military is viewed by leaders
around the world as having diplomatic status, potentially with more influence than the U.S.
ambassadors in those countries. The last hypothesis is that economic and social
development is linked with the U.S. military's security goals and therefore is becoming
increasingly important Priest also provides a comprehensive background of Zinni's military

12

This research protocol was approved by the Eastern Illinois University I nstitutional Review Board on
November 1 8, 2 0 1 1 . File N umber: 1 1 - 1 5 6.
1 3 The interview questions asked to General Zinni can be found in Appendix B.
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career and p ersonal traits and beliefs that will supplement many of his interview
responses.
Hypothesis 1 :
The Military Has Increasing Diplomatic Influence Because of its Available Resources
General Zinni, when asked about the military's resources, agreed that indeed his
resources as a Unified Combatant Command, or UCC, and the resources of the military, in
general, overshadow those of the State Department. He goes so far as to say, "They (the
State Department) had nowhere near the resources we had in scope and scale" (Zinni,
2 0 1 2) . The State Department was aware of this and was frustrated with its limits in
resources. General Zinni took it upon himself to never try to overshadow the formal U.S.
diplomatic side o f relations within his region of command, recognizing the importance of
the diplomats' work and the necessary cooperation between the State Department and the
military.
Priest also examines the question of an imbalance of resources between the military
and the State D epartment. She cites the fact that Zinni's budget was always classified and
never directly accounted for in the budget. By keeping it as an unidentified part of the
Department of Defense's overall budget, Congress could never take it away. The UC C's
budget would be decided among the officials within the Department of Defense, therefore it
was never decided upon within the political sphere, like the State Department's budget is
decided upon (Priest, 2004: 1 14).
Apart from financial resources, Priest argues that the military, Zinni in particular,
had more freedom and access for travel and communication. The ability to travel around
the world is, as Priest says, the best intelligence weapon that Zinni had (2004: 76) . Zinni
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had an extensive convoy including his own B oeing 707, multiple pilots, mechanics, satellite
radios and phones, aides, cooks, personal assistants, and even am armored BMW (Priest,
2004: 7 6). Zinni himself argues that while the military does have much more control over
their financial budget, money is not the only reason the military has been growing in
diplomatic influence. He says that their presence, which is more exaggerated than the
presence of the U.S. diplomats, helps their reputation with countries' leaders, and this
increased presence is a result of their ability to move and to communicate around the
world (Zinni, 2 0 1 2 ) .
T h e lack of resources from the State Department also contributes t o the military's
rise in influence. Zinni gave examples of the sort of "nation-building" proj ects that were
done under his command. When doing a report on Iraq, the military was the branch
running zoos, swimming pools, reconnecting energy grids, and establishing anti-corruption
task forces. The military is involved in these proj ects and others that involve political,
economic, and social reconstruction because, in part, "the State Department j ust doesn't
have the resources" (Zinni, 2 0 12). Development is so important that when the State
Department cannot carry out everything that is needed at the time, partially due to their
lack of resources, the military steps in to complete them. The limits on the State
Department's resources allow for the military to use their own and in turn their diplomatic
influence and involvement in development and other political initiatives grows. Zinni
believed that while the State Department may have been frustrated, and presumably still is,
with their resource limitations, they were pleased that these proj ects were still being
completed. He goes on to say that he always tried to help everyone he could. Often times he
worked more closely with countries that were a higher priority to U.S. foreign policy, such

65

as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan (Zinni, 2 0 1 2) . During Zinni's time as a UCC he worked
very closely with the State Department because both sides understood that the military had
the necessary resources.
Many ambassadors have shared their frustration with their own budget restrictions.
When asked about the military's increasing role in influencing U.S. foreign policy, some
agree that this is indeed happening, and attribute to it to their larger budget. Ambassador
Pete Peterson, who served in Vietnam from 1 998-2 001, said that the military did not have a
large influence in Vietnam during his time. He did have the Secretary of Defense visit
Vietnam as a part of a proj ect in recovering the bodies of missing soldiers and prisoners-of
war from the Vietnam conflict, however the military was not carrying out any diplomatic
related proj ects themselves. Recognizing the new trend in U.S. foreign relations,
Ambassador Peterson believed the military's growing influence is a direct result of their
budget. The State Department's budget has been decreasing over the years while the
Department of D efense' budget has not. The military simply has the available funds to
influence diplomatic relations abroad (Peterson, 2 0 12). Ambassador Hughes, who served
as ambassador to Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean from 1990 to 1993, also recognized
the influence that the military's regional commanders had in "pulling Washington's purse
strings" (Hughes, 2 0 1 2 ) . While the military was not very active within his host countries,
he wished they had been more so because they could have used their own resources to help
the military troops in the Eastern Caribbean, such as rebuilding their barracks. Even when
the military did not have a strong diplomatic presence, this ambassador recognized the
benefits of partnering with the military and using the military's resources to help the host
country.
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Zinni also gave special attention to how the military helped the State Department
with diplomatic relations outside of development proj ects. He said that entertaining is
incredibly important to interact with local leadership, and often the U.S. ambassadors had
very small budgets to entertain. Here Zinni would take the military band from one country
to another for ambassador events. Perhaps he would take a military ship into a port, have
the military carry-out a civic action program, and then in the evening host an event for the
local and the U.S. leadership to interact. No matter what sort of proj ect, Zinni would always
give credit to the U.S. ambassador of that country. He would have his troops work with
another country's military to train them to be more responsible with hazardous waste
exposal, and give credit to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the ambassador.
Another example Zinni gives is when the military would rebuild a school or perhaps paint a
clinic, he would always have the ambassador take responsibility and to cut the ribbon.
(Zinni, 2 0 1 2 ) . These are examples of not j ust the military carrying out their own
diplomatic-related projects, but actually serving as the liaison between the host country
and the U.S. ambassador - being diplomats of the U.S. and for the U.S.
Zinni believed that his position within the military as a UCC also allowed him more
direct contact with leaders in Washington. Zinni, as a UCC, answered directly to the
Secretary of Defense William Cohen and then to President Clinton. His chain of command
was incredibly short, especially compared to the chain of command that most ambassadors
must follow in the State Department. Cohen relied heavily on his UCCs and therefore
arranged for Zinni and the other regional commanders to meet one-on-one with the
president several times each year. According to Zinni, President Clinton appreciated these
meetings and because of the direct contact with the UCCs he was very engaged with the

67

military's plans, ideas, and how these commanders viewed their personal roles (Zinni,
2 0 1 2) . Having such a direct route to the resources of the President and the Secretary of
Defense's opinions, authority, and support allowed Zinni to have much more influence and
power than an ambassador. Zinni understands that the State Department does not have the
same sort of direct connection with the policy makers in Washington, D.C. as he had during
his time as UCC (Zinni, 2 0 1 2).
Many of the ambassadors interviewed shared their frustration in working with the
thick b ureaucracy that makes up the State Department. When trying to work in shaping
foreign policy, the State Department follows the communication lines of a rigorous
hierarchy. Ambassador Peterson, the former ambassador to Vietnam, says that working
with the State Department "absolutely drove [him] crazy" because of the naturally slow
pace of decisions made within the department (Zinni, 2 0 12).
Hypothesis 2 :
The M ilitary is viewed as Having A Higher Status than U.S. Diplomats
Zinni recognized that the military has a strong and growing diplomatic influence
around the world, and this was especially apparent with his own experiences as UCC. He
agrees with statements made by President Clinton that the U.S. has an "over-militarized
foreign policy." While the military's resources are a large part of this, Zinni describes other
factors that allow the military to be a strong influence in diplomatic relations. These
include a shared militaristic history with country leaders, a great time spent in country, and
an emphasis on the history and culture of not j ust one country, but on an entire region.
These factors help the military carryout their "nation-building" proj ects and allow them the
reputation of being the face of the U.S. around the world (Zinni, 2 0 12).
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Zinni describes his time as UCC as being treated with a tremendous amount of
respect. Priest retells stories of how leaders would take Zinni by the hand and lead him
around their palaces. General Zinni attributes these close relations and the respect he
received to a militaristic background he shared with many of the leaders. He gave an
example of relating to the former Egyptian President Muhammad Hosni El Sayed Mubarak
at the time because they both had a common military career. This was true with many of
the political leaders Zinni encountered, who came to power by rising through military
ranks. The concerns they brought to Zinni had a military focus, such as issues security,
training, and equipment (Zinni, 2 0 12). The U.S. ambassadors were often politically
appointed, often times coming from a career in business, or most of their careers was spent
within the Foreign Service. Zinni believes the political leaders within his Central Command
more easily related to him because both sides shared a strong similarity with the military,
and this helped the leaders see Zinni as an equal, as someone who quickly understood their
concerns and knew how to help.
Zinni gave great attention and thought to the culture of the region under his
command. Priest describes Zinni's concern for understanding Vietnam's unique culture
when he fought during the Vietnam war, realizing that success of any mission could only
come from understanding the troubles of other nations (2004: 65) . He continued
experiencing the need of cultural understanding while fighting in the Gulf War. He himself
stated, "the context of the culture was critically important" (Zinni, 2 0 1 2 ) . Zinni was
strongly impacted as he watched the Kurds in Iraq starve and fight over food, giving up
their children in hopes the military could give them medical care, trying to solve who in the
Kurdish tribes were the decision-makers so his troops could deliver assistance (Priest,
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2004: 66). Throughout his military career Zinni constantly fought to understand as much as
he could, a trait that easily helped him connect and form relationships with the higher
political leaders when he was UCC. Ambassadors are expected to understand the culture
and traditions of whatever country they are serving in, and Zinni, understanding the
importance of this knowledge to any military mission, followed these diplomatic protocols.
Again we see Zinni act in a diplomatic fashion, even as a military general.
Seventy p ercent of his time, Zinni reports, was dedicated to traveling around the
region (Zinni, 2 0 1 2 ) . He would try to divide up his travel between four areas to make sure
he gave the deserved attention and focus to each part of his command. The first area was
East Africa, Jordan, and Egypt, the second was the Arabian Peninsula, the third was Iran
and the surrounding countries, and the fourth was Central Asia and Pakistan. Zinni spent
much of his time in multiple countries, creating a stronger presence than one ambassador
from one country could. The military also developed strategies with a regional-scope
instead of a strategy for just one country (Zinni, 2 0 1 2) . Because their jurisdiction through
the U.S. military is larger than the jurisdiction for one ambassador, their presence is greater
known, and they are easily seen as having more authority because their authority is more
wide-spread than a single ambassador's. Zinni gave the example of General David Petraeus:
he questions if anyone can name the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, but almost everyone could
name Petraeus, showing that indeed, more attention is given to the military commanders
because they are seen as the face of U.S. policy (Zinni, 2 0 1 2 ) . He believes that the local
people throughout the Central Command looked at the UCC and other regional
commanders as having clout and authority, and Zinni assumed that reputation (Zinni,
2012).
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Additionally, Zinni agreed that as a UCC he had a lot of flexibility in shaping U.S.
foreign policy within his region (Zinni, 20 12). While the large military budget and presence
within the region h elped Zinni have greater influence, he mentions the distinct culture of
the military. The military has a strong culture of planning with more specialized people
who were trained to work quickly through tough issues. Their planning, especially under
the command of Zinni, incorporated cultural, social, political, and economic issues. Zinni
argues that because of their detailed planning, the military often had a more forceful,
comprehensive, and strategic design than what the State Department could come up with.
This is because the State Department first does not have the resources necessary, but more
importantly their culture is not based around planning (Zinni, 2 0 1 2 ) . He cited one of the
most frustrating aspects of being CinC was having a strong military plan for a specific
proj ect, and other departments, such as the United States Agency for International
Development, having no plan of their own for reconstruction or stabilization. The military
has many more people within the region that are specialized in more areas than the State
Department, and because everyone is trained to work in a certain way and their entire
culture is based in planning, they often have the upper hand when influencing U.S. foreign
policy over the State Department.
Hypothesis 3:
Economic and Political Development Has Increasing Importance to Military Missions
Throughout his military career, Zinni discovered the importance of humanitarian
aid and relief partnered with and a thorough understanding of local customs and history to
the success of military missions (Priest, 2004: 66) . As a UCC he was in charge of missions
that included security and environmental issues to economic assistance. This is, Zinni said,
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because the nature of combat has changed. Conventionally soldiers would fight on a
battlefield and then someone else would "clean up the mess" and re-stabilize the broken
society. Now, the military must keep a society stable during conflict, and so the social and
economic problems are a concern from the very beginning of any mission. Zinni argues that
the military component is actually subordinate to the development of the society; therefore
the military must be more involved in the political, economic, and social reconstruction
(Zinni, 2 0 1 2 ) . Therefore the military is in charge of proj ects, as stated above, such as
managing public swimming pools alongside establishing anti-corruption task forces.
One part of the new importance on development as a military tool is that many
security issues are linked to economic issues. General Zinni cited this strategy as beginning
under President Jimmy Carter and President Ronald Reagan, who both deemed the
protection of gas and oil resources as critically important. The economic mission of
protecting gas and oil dates back to the Cold War. Protecting these natural resources
involves other issues such as access to the region, freedom of navigation, and economic
components involving the local economies and international trade and finance. For
example, protecting the Suez Canal involved both security and economic aspects. Any
threat to freedom of navigation and commercial trading to such an important world
trading route is also entwined with the economic livelihood of the region. Zinni even
argued that any threat to this route is entwined with the economics of the rest of the world
(Zinni, 2 0 1 2 ) .
Ambassador D avid Rawson, who served in Rwanda at the beginning of the Rwandan
genocide, shared his experiences of working with the military during an extraordinary
humanitarian mission after the genocide. He described the mission as a j oint operation
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between himself and the State Department and the military, in which he worked closely
with the military general and the troops on the ground in Rwanda. There were visits by
United Nations commander of Europe, General Joint Chief of Staffs, and from the U.S.
Secretary of Defense (Zinni, 2 0 1 2). Here we see the ambassador and the military working
closely on development and aid projects in the light of a large-scale humanitarian crisis.
While the economic situation of the Central Command countries closely impacted its
security threats, Zinni is also noted for his general views on development. Priest quotes
some of Zinni's questions, such as "What is our obligation to the world?" Zinni believes that
Americans should care about the development of other countries throughout the world
because a more stable world does benefit us. If we, as Americans, are generally better off
than most of the world, he believes we should accept this and help other countries develop
because it is simply the right thing to do (Priest, 2004: 1 1 7). Zinni believes that if the
United States, both the overall public and the national policy makers, decided to use
development initiatives to truly increase the values of human rights and democracy in
developing countries, that we would make a much greater difference in the world (Priest,
2 004: 1 1 7) . That difference, while morally sound, would also directly benefit our own
security and economic relations.
Conclusion
When asked about the future direction of the military's involvement with "nation
building" activities and its increased role in U.S. foreign policy, Zinni answered that we
must simply l egitimize the military's involvement. His suggestion is to create a separate
command for such economic and social development strategies so that it is not solely the
military that has all the resources, control, and authority over such plans. Yet the major
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effort would be to change the culture of entire departments, such as the Department of
State, in order to have effective plans and be able to muster the necessary resources to
carry out and execute real development initiatives. General Zinni believes the U.S.
government lacks the integration between departments that would help carry-out
development programs, and until that happens the military will most likely be the branch
that will continue to control the logistics, planning, and team-building that puts these
missions together (Zinni, 2 0 12).
The U.S. military's increasing role is very apparent when speaking with
ambassadors who served longer ago. For example, Ambassador Melady was the former
ambassador to Burundi and Uganda from 1969-1973, consecutively. When asked about the
military's presence in his host countries when he served, he only met with a military
attache once a month (Melady, 20 12). While he did not have personal experience with a
large military presence in his host countries, he believes that their increasing role is due to
larger security threats. In parts of Africa, especially, the U.S. government has greater
interest in neutralizing terrorist activity and therefore has an increasing presence to help
dissolve increasing security threats. This could potentially be another factor for the
military's new diplomatic role, however Zinni does not mention larger security threats as a
potential factor.
Similar to Ambassador Melady, Ambassador Miller, who served in Tanzania and
Zimbabwe from 1 9 8 1 - 1 986, consecutively, did not experience a large military presence in
his h ost country. He recognized that during his time of service the military did not have
near the power or the authority they have today (Miller, 2 0 1 2 ) . He did not have an
observation as to why the military has more influence today than in the 1980s, but the fact
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that he recognized there has been a significant shift over this time period suggests the
military is indeed sharing a larger role in diplomatic relations.
From Zinni and his experiences as a UCC, the large influence the military is gaining
within U.S. foreign policy is better understood. The military has a large budget, seemingly
limitless resources, and a culture that puts them in more control over the proj ects the U.S.
carries out around the world. As UCC, Zinni used his power to form close relationships with
political leaders in the Central Command and emphasized the importance of cultural
understanding when dealing with both security and economic issues. His time as UCC
showed that the ambassadors in the region were not always considered the first
representative of the United States, but in fact Zinni was. This is easily the result of a
mutual military backgrounds and the large amount of time Zinni spent within the region,
and yet Zinni gives multiple examples of common situations in which he and the military
served as the liaison between foreign political leaders and the U.S. ambassadors.
Ambassadors should serve as the liaison between these political leaders and the U.S.
government, and yet Zinni seems to have served as an ambassador to the ambassador.
While Zinni is j ust one example, his example is significant and heeds to the fact that U.S
diplomacy is not only being carried out by our official appointed ambassadors, but also
instead it seems the military's new role is here to stay.
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Chapter 5 : Conclusion

Diplomacy is the act and tradition that holds together the relations between the
United States and foreign countries. It has a longstanding history as an elite and respected
position, a role that can only be fulfilled by certain types of individuals (Sharp, 1999: 5;
Stearns, 1 9 7 3 : 1 54 ) These individuals have striven to represent the United States properly,
.

promote U.S. interests, communicate between governments, negotiate peace, pressure
actions, and all other work that is needed in the daily work of an ambassador.
It must be noted that there are some limitations to this study. First, only eight
ambassadors and one military general were available to be interviewed. The ambassadors
all served in developing countries. Because of the economic status of the countries in which
they served, international development may have been more important to their work than
it would be to an ambassador who served in a developed country. For example,
Ambassador Maisto served in both Nicaragua and Venezuela. At his time of service
Nicaragua was considered an extremely underdeveloped country where Venezuela was
one o f the richest countries in Latin America. He clearly stated that because of Venezuela's
economic status, no attention was needed on international development because the
United States did not have any development proj ects there. Maisto spent more time
working on economic and social development work in Nicaragua because of the existing
poor economic state of Nicaragua (Maisto, 2 0 1 1) . While this is an obvious fact, it should be
noted that most of the former ambassadors interviewed served in lesser-developed
nations.
Yet the availability of former ambassadors was limited, and every one was included
that was available. Fortunately the ambassadors served over a wide range of time

76

representing multiple presidential administrations. There was also a mix between Foreign
Service career ambassadors and ambassadors who were politically appointed. While the
number of ambassadors who were available to be interviewed was limited, the sample still
provides a range of time and of the type of ambassador.
Stearns tries to define the role of a diplomat and the practice of diplomacy. He states
that diplomacy is our world's response in trying to solve complex international problems
such as terrorism, human rights, conflict, health epidemics, and economic gaps. Yet he is
clear that these current problems cannot be solved with traditional diplomacy. Our world's
nations must find new ways to work together, and "greater diplomatic effort will be
required" (Stearns, 1996: 18). This research tried to find in what ways diplomacy must
shift to better combat the demanded solutions of international problems.
To do so, this research used a method built by Graham Allison (1969) that follows
the decision-making process of U.S. foreign policy and breaks it down into three different
components: the national level, the organizational model, and the bureaucratic politics
model. Chapter two applied Allison's model to the case of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The
three models looked at President Bill Clinton's rational choices, the standard operating
procedures of the State Department, and then the internal politics within the bureaucracy
of the State Department. This research was unique in that a personal interview was
conducted with the former ambassador to Rwanda, David Rawson, who was present at the
time of the outbreak of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. His responses helped supplement the
direction decisions were made throughout Allison's three levels, and provided a clearer
comprehension of what the role of an ambassador is within such an extreme case.
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Chapter three focused away from one specific case study to look at U.S. diplomacy in
more general terms. The telephone interviews indicate how diplomacy has shifted from the
traditional days of negotiations and stiff political formalities. The day-to-day tasks and
large contributions U.S. ambassadors left as their legacies show the importance of
diplomacy, as most previous scholars agree to, and how diplomacy is changing. There is a
large emphasis on international development work, suggested by the amount of time the
ambassadors interviewed spent working with aid and development organizations, and
some of the individuals' specific goals of raising their host country's GDP or operating a
large foreign aid distribution. Secretary of State Clinton pushes for an increased link
between diplomacy and development, for the two are becoming interdependent to
continue beneficial relations between the United States and foreign countries.
While diplomacy is changing within its own tactics and focuses, outside factors are
also waging their influences. One of the largest outside factors is the U.S. military. Chapter 4
finds why the military has such a large significance around the world and is becoming
increasingly so within diplomatic practices. An interview with General Anthony Zinni, who
served as the Commander-in-Chief of the Central Command, known today as a Unified
Combatant Command, provides insights into the military's resources and bureaucratic
structure that provides them the flexibility to influence U.S. foreign policy. General Zinni
had great diplomatic power within his region of command. His troops had the resources to
carry out large development proj ects and travel extensively to form a constant presence
within numerous countries. Zinni's example challenges the role of our U.S. ambassadors
and their presence, which provided strong support for Priest's findings (2 003).
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This research provides a clearer understanding of how U.S. diplomacy is performed
and how it is shifting to combat broader and more complex international problems. This
understanding is crucial because the act of diplomacy is at the center of foreign relations
and the interactions of every state. For the United States, diplomacy provides answers to
how our foreign policy is shaped, such as in the case of the U.S. response to the Rwandan
genocide, and how we can maintain stable and ever-forwarding relations with foreign
countries and protect our national interests and security. Diplomacy must include
development initiatives, as many former ambassadors have done and as Secretary of State
Clinton believes needs to be pursued farther. Development is directly linked to security,
and is therefore should be in the best interest of the United States. General Zinni believes
that the U.S. military should be allowed to carry out economic, social, and political projects
while working closely with the State Department and in-country ambassadors. The military
has an incredible advantage over the State Department in its seemingly limitless resources
to influence U.S. foreign policy and diplomatic relations.
This new research implies much for U.S. policy-making. Ambassadors still rest at the
forefront of U.S. representation to foreign nations and are responsible for presenting and
acting on behalf of U.S. interests. If the interest of the United States is to have increasingly
stable relations with the rest of the world, then, as Zinni showed, U.S. security is directly
tied to the economic development and status of other countries. Secretary of State Clinton
also agreed with this, pushing for ambassadors to have a heavier hand in the international
development of their host countries. Yet the State Department does not hold the resources
to give ambassadors the opportunity to provide development proj ects. Instead, it is the
military that holds a seemingly unlimited budget and an expanse of resources.
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Therefore, the U.S. military and the State Department must find a balance, exactly
what Clinton states ( 2 0 1 0 : 13). General Zinni argued for a separate department to be
created that could be comprised of personnel from the military, the State Department, and
other organizations so the U.S. effort for international development would be unified
througho ut the world. Either way, here are two U.S. leaders who have, or have had, a strong
influence in shaping U.S. foreign policy that both agree the United States needs to have a
better balance between the State Department and the military in carrying out international
development initiatives.
Overall, the United States is seen as a leader within international relations and it
must continue its strongest methods of engagement and interactions with the world:
diplomacy. Scholars agree that diplomacy has changed but does not quite understand how.
This research showed that much of the change is evolving around international
development while the traditional functions of representation still remain relevant. The
military agrees that they are increasingly influencing diplomacy. Ambassadors are
balancing calculated public appearances with hands-on development and economic
initiatives. And the Secretary of State is pushing for development practices to become the
focus of diplomacy and forging stronger partnerships with the military and other
development organizations. Diplomacy will stay the integral action in state-to-state
interactions, but the traditional "who, what, why" is expanding to include new military
actors and a firm emphasis on international development. I f ambassadors adapt to the
changing sub stance of U.S. foreign policy and continue to work with the military, then
p erhaps, as Cooper believes, diplomacy will become even more important to continue
beneficial relations between the United States and the rest of the world (1997 /1998: 1 75) .
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Appendix A
Interview Questions for Former U.S. Ambassadors
Could you describe a typical day while working in your host country?
What i s the most significant task you accomplished while serving a s ambassador?
What are some specific U.S. policies that you represented t o your host country?
I f an ambassador wanted to shift U.S. foreign policy toward their host country, how
would they successfully do it?
5. Was there ever a crisis or situation in which you needed to urgently respond? Could
you describe the events that took place and the protocol you followed?
6. Some research suggests that the American military and especially the regional
commanders have grown substantially in diplomatic influence. Was this your
experience as Ambassador?
7. What was the most frustrating aspect of being an ambassador?
8. What are some standard protocols that all ambassadors are expected to follow?
9 . As a n Ambassador, how often did you work with development organizations?
1 0 . What is one task that needs to still be accomplished to forward beneficial relations
between the U.S. and your host country?

1.
2.
3.
4.
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Appendix B
Interview Questions for Former Unified Combatant Commander, Anthony Zinni
1 . Could y o u describe a typical day while being a CinC?
2 . M ost of m y thesis is looking at the State Department, and so how often did you
interact with the State Department?
3. Were there any specific ambassadors you worked with more closely than others?
4. I've read Dana Priest's book and she describes you as someone who really tried to
first understand the culture of a region. Could you explain why this is so important
to do, especially for your military missions?
5. How did economic and social development policies fit into your role as CinC?
6. Another interesting dialogue that Priest explains is the close relationship you often
had with country leaders. For example she tells the story of you being led around a
palace by a little boy. Is that how you were normally treated throughout your
region?
7. Again going back to Priest, she describes diplomatic convoys in which you were in
the lead car even though traditionally you would have been placed behind the cars
of ambassadors. Again, was this a normal occurrence?
8. Priest argues that the Cine's resources completely overshadow the State
Department's, and because of that your influence in the region is so much larger. Is
that an accurate depiction?
9. How much flexibility do you feel you had in shaping U.S. foreign policy? (In contrast
to the State D epartment, which has very little flexibility)
1 0 . What was your most significant accomplishment?
1 1. What was the most frustrating aspect of being a CinC?
1 2 . When looking to the future, where do you see the role of the military in terms of
nation-building missions and working with economic and social development
policies?
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